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PUTTING RATIONALITY BACK INTO THE RATIONAL
BASIS TEST: SAVING SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
AND REDEEMING THE PROMISE OF THE NINTH
AMENDMENT
Jeffrey D. Jackson *
I. INTRODUCTION
Substantive due process is broken. This doctrine, which pro-
vides that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments contain substantive limits on the power of federal
and state governments, has been an important protector of rights
since its beginnings in English law, and the main vehicle through
which the protections of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated
against the states., However, as currently practiced by the Su-
preme Court of the United States, the tiered scrutiny formulation
of substantive due process is illusory. It is followed only in easy
cases, and abandoned in hard ones. 2 This practice throws the legi-
timacy of the entire doctrine into question.
The legitimacy of the doctrine is an important issue because
substantive due process is the primary means through which the
* Associate Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law. I would like to
thank Bill Rich, Bill Merkel, John Bickers, Linda Elrod, Jim Concannon, Nancy Maxwell,
Brad Borden, Michael Schwartz, John Christensen, Rory Bahadur, and Kelly Anders for
their helpful comments and input on this article. Thanks also to Washburn University
School of Law for its research support, and to Amanda R. Haas, J.D. Candidate, 2011, for
her research and input.
1. See CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES
445-47 (2d ed. 2005).
2. See infra notes 222-47 and accompanying text (explaining the current state of
substantive due process); see also Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due
Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 63, 66-68 (2006) (noting that substantive due process is in "se-
rious disarray" and discussing three inconsistent theories relied on by the Court); Mark C.
Niles, Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due Process Analysis
of Personal Autonomy Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 85, 137-40 (2000) (describing substantive
due process used by the Court as a "weak and ultimately unsatisfactory mechanism").
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Court gives substance to the Ninth Amendment's rights "retained
by the people."3 The failure to articulate a consistent test, com-
bined with the vagueness of the language of the Ninth Amend-
ment and the practical consequences of the Court's professed ad-
judication mechanism for rights, has led to a reluctance on the
part of the Court to protect rights.4
Under the Court's current due process adjudication mechan-
ism, rights are either classified as "fundamental," in which case
laws infringing upon them are subject to strict scrutiny, a test
which is almost always "fatal in fact" for the infringing law, or
they are not classified as fundamental, and are subjected to a ra-
tional basis test that almost always upholds the infringing law.5
Because a finding that a right is fundamental almost always
leads to the conclusion that the law infringing it is invalid, courts
have been understandably cautious in recognizing new rights.6
However, the only alternative is the weak rational basis test,
which provides little protection for rights.
The legitimacy problems with substantive due process as it is
currently practiced have prompted many legal scholars to urge
the abandonment of due process altogether in favor of other me-
chanisms of protecting unenumerated rights.7 As well-thought out
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IX; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 794 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing Ninth Amendment rights).
4. See Niles, supra note 2, at 137, 138 (noting problems associated with due process
adjudication of unenumerated rights); Joseph F. Kadlec, Note, Employing the Ninth
Amendment to Supplement Substantive Due Process: Recognizing the History of the Ninth
Amendment and the Existence of Nonfundamental Unenumerated Rights, 48 B.C. L. REV.
387, 387-88 (2007) (also noting problems associated with due process adjudication).
5. Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (2008); see Note,
supra note 4, at 387-88, 390-91; see also Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (referencing the phrase "fatal in fact"
to describe strict scrutiny). But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An
Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 794-96
(2006) (using empirical analysis to dispute the contention that strict scrutiny is nearly al-
ways fatal to the infringing law).
6. See Niles, supra note 2, at 137-38. The Supreme Court of the United States has
articulated this reluctance. See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125
(1992) (stating that the Court is "reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due
process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are
scarce and open-ended" (citing Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-
26 (1985)).
7. See infra notes 241-58 and accompanying text (discussing these ideas); see also
Barnett, supra note 5, at 14-80 (proposing an alternative to the substantive due process
doctrine); Niles, supra note 2, at 123-43 (proposing an alternative to the substantive due
process doctrine).
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as these proposed solutions are, however, they all share a funda-
mental problem as a practical manner: they would all require a
substantial overhaul of the entire body of case law that has
evolved around the due process doctrine in the last century and a
half. Because of the practical problems involved with such an
overhaul, these solutions are unlikely to be adopted.
There is, however, another way in which substantive due
process can be revitalized to better protect rights and provide a
more consistent doctrine. This revitalization can be achieved
without significantly changing the doctrine itself. The answer lies
in strengthening the rational basis test.
The rational basis test as it currently stands is too weak. By al-
lowing any plausible reason for the legislation to suffice, whether
or not it was a true reason for the legislation, and by asking only
whether lawmakers could have thought that it was reasonably re-
lated to the subject it purported to advance, the Court has essen-
tially made the rational basis test the equivalent to no test at all.
A strengthened rational basis test, however, would require that
the legislation at issue actually be reasonably related to its legis-
lative purpose, and that the purpose be valid. Such a test would
allow courts to better protect rights, while at the same time re-
tain the benefits of tiered scrutiny as it currently exists. By allow-
ing courts to inquire into the purpose behind the legislation and
to look at the link between the ends and the means, courts will no
longer have to try to find some way around the test in hard cases,
and the doctrine will become more consistent and legitimate.
This article argues for the adoption of a strengthened rational
basis test that would allow courts to scrutinize the actual purpose
behind legislation and demand that the legislation actually be
reasonably related to its valid legislative purpose. Part II looks at
the question of why it is desirable to save substantive due process
rather than replace it with some other doctrine. Part III examines
how substantive due process came to be the dominant form of
protection for unenumerated rights, and how it has evolved from
its antecedents in English law to the current test. It concludes
that substantive due process has been an ever-evolving doctrine,
but that the protection of rights has been a constant throughout
its history. Part IV examines how the system has become broken
in recent years, with the rational basis test and the strict scrutiny
test edging further away from each other and the Supreme Court
2011]1 493
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of the United States abandoning the doctrine in hard cases. Part
V then advocates for using a strengthened rational basis test to
return rationality to the rational basis test, add legitimacy to the
doctrine of substantive due process, and better protect unenume-
rated rights. It explains how the strengthened rational basis test
would work in practice, and how the test avoids some of the prob-
lems of the other tests, including the Lochner problem.
II. WHY SAVE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AT ALL?
One question that must be addressed is why it is desirable to
save substantive due process at all. After all, the concept of subs-
tantive due process has had numerous detractors since its intro-
duction.' The criticisms of substantive due process as a concept
range from the awkwardness of its terminology,9 to its supposed
lack of a historical foundation,o to a rejection of its open-ended
nature as a foundation for unenumerated rights." Thus, goes the
argument, if substantive due process is self-contradictory, ahis-
torical, and doctrinally vague, why engage in a quixotic effort to
make it work?
The problem with this argument is that substantive due
process is the chosen path used by courts to give effect to the lan-
guage of the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.12 In its text, the Ninth Amendment clearly indicates that
there are rights other than those enumerated in the Bill of Rights
8. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 14-30 (1980).
9. See id. at 18 (famously referring to substantive due process as a "contradiction in
terms" akin to "green pastel redness").
10. See id. at 15 (noting the argument that the phrase "due process of law" in the
Fourteenth Amendment was taken from the language of the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, and that "[tihere is general agreement that the [Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause] had been understood at the time of its inclusion to refer only to lawful
procedure[sf'); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
SECOND CENTURY 45 (1990) (arguing that substantive due process was "not what was pro-
vided in Magna Charta"); Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before
the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 372-73 (1911); Charles Warren, The New 'Liberty"
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 440-41 (1926).
11. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 31 (1990) (referring to substantive due process as a "sham").
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."); see infra Part
III (discussing how substantive due process came to be the dominant form of protection for
unenumerated rights).
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that deserve constitutional protection." For over one hundred
years, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments have been the chosen vehicles for discovering and
applying these rights. While it may be argued that the concept of
unenumerated rights should be abandoned in favor of only tex-
tual rights and democratic majorities,14 there is no question that
unenumerated rights have been a part of American constitutio-
nalism from the beginning, and that substantive due process has
been the main workhorse of the doctrine. If unenumerated rights
are going to continue to be a feature of the constitutional land-
scape, this will likely continue.
Further, the criticisms of substantive due process as a concept
are not, for lack of a better word, as "substantial" as they might
first appear. It is true that the phrase itself, "substantive due
process," is ungainly. " Substantive due process itself seems to be
a contradiction in terms, in the famous words of John Hart Ely, a
"'green pastel redness."' However, this twist of terminology is
explained by its history. The term "substantive due process" was
coined by its opponents, as a way of denigrating the concept." The
Supreme Court did not use the term until 1948, long after its
supposed heyday was past."
Those who criticize substantive due process as ahistorical ar-
gue that the original meaning of the Due Process Clause was
simply procedural, and that courts illegitimately grafted substan-
tive concerns on it to further their own ideas of what the law
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
14. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democ-
racy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89, 107 (1988) (contrasting unenumerated rights with constitu-
tional democracy).
15. MASSEY, supra note 1, at 445 ("Substantive due process is an ungainly concept.").
16. ELY, supra note 8, at 18.
17. JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON-LAW LIBERTY: RETHINKING AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 134 (2003) (stating that the term substantive due process was "de-
vised precisely to discredit" the idea).
18. See James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Ori-
gins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 319 & n.20 (1999) (identifying
Justice Rutledge's dissent in Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90
(1948), as the first mention of the term by a justice on the Supreme Court).
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should be in the late eighteen hundreds and early nineteen hun-
dreds.19 However, the idea that due process contains a substan-
tive concept is much older than that.
The term "due process" has its roots in the 'law of the land"
provision in Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta.2 0 There is some de-
bate as to whether Chapter 39 intended any substantive re-
straints on the government in its original form.21 However, by the
seventeenth century, it was invoked as not only a procedural
guarantee that the government must obey the laws in force, but
also as a substantive guarantee that the laws themselves be con-
sistent with the natural and customary rights of the people.2 Un-
der this invocation, laws that contravened the customary rights
were not law, but instead were arbitrary assertions of power. 23
This is not to say that there existed some concept of judicial re-
view that would allow judges to overturn laws, but rather that
such laws were not entitled to be called law.24
This notion of the substantive content of due process was im-
ported by the colonists to the Americas, even as it began to wane
in Great Britain in favor of parliamentary supremacy.6 By the
time of the American Revolution, due process in Britain had be-
19. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 221-22 (1997) (arguing that the "one thing quite plainly [due
process] did not mean, in either 1789 or 1866 . .. [was] judicial power to override legisla-
tion on substantive or policy grounds"); see also Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due
Process of Law Before the Civil War, in 1 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 203,
205, 206 (Pendleton Howard ed., 1938).
20. See Ely, supra note 18, at 320-21. Chapter 39 provides, in pertinent part, that
"[n]o free man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, outlawed, banished, or in any way
destroyed, nor will We proceed against or prosecute him, except by lawful judgment of his
peers and by the law of the land." Id. at 320.
21. Compare, e.g., BERGER, supra note 19, at 224-26, with Charles Howard McIlwain,
Due Process of Law in Magna Carta, in 1 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, su-
pra note 19, at 174, 202 ("There is evidence in plenty . . . that 'the law of the land' was un-
derstood in 1215 also to mean the substantive principles of the customary law.").
22. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due
Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58
EMORY L.J. 585, 596-612 (2009) (explaining the use of the "law of land" provision in Eng-
lish constitutional law of the late seventeenth century); see also JOHN PHILLIP REID, RULE
OF LAW: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH
CENTURIES 78-79 (2004).
23. See Gedicks, supra note 22, at 596.
24. Id. at 644-45 (discussing the classical understanding of "the law').
25. JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION:
THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 76 (1986); REID, supra note 22, at 78-79; Gedicks, supra note
22, at 595.
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come whatever Parliament enacted.2 6 However, America still
clung to the idea that due process had substance, and could be
used to restrain governments from violating rights. 27 It would be
an important part of the colonists' arguments against British
rule, wherein they cited the Magna Carta's "law of the land" pro-
vision as a substantive bar to Parliament's actions. 28 This is the
background against which the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause was created, and the language carried forward into the
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the Due Process Clause is not
such an ahistorical home for unenumerated rights as might be
thought.
Further, although substantive due process has been criticized
for lacking sufficient guideposts for decisionmaking,"9 it is not
clear that any of the suggested replacements fare any better in
this regard. Neither the Privileges or Immunities Clause, as sug-
gested by John Hart Ely, 0 nor the Ninth Amendment, as sug-
gested by others, ' provide any more reliable guideposts for inter-
pretation. Although the Privileges or Immunities Clause does at
least speak of "privileges" and "immunities," it gives no clues as
to how to determine what those categories encompass. 32 Indeed,
the problem with its open-ended nature has led to its constitu-
tional irrelevance.33 In the same manner, although the Ninth
Amendment suggests that there are other rights "retained by the
26. See REID, supra note 22, at 78.
27. Id; see also Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV.
941, 963-69 (detailing the uses of the law of land provisions in Colonial America).
28. See REID, supra note 22, at 77-78; Riggs, supra note 27, at 970-71.
29. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-21 (1997) (commenting that the
Court has "always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process be-
cause guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and
open-ended" (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)));
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 3 (1997) (comparing substantive due
process to a "patched and leaky tire" that "follows no sound method of interpretation"); see
also Niles, supra note 2, at 135-40 (noting the criticisms of substantive due process).
30. ELY, supra note 8, at 28-30.
31. See, e.g., Niles, supra note 2, at 137-38.
32. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. See Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death:
The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1085
(2000) (ascribing Justice Frankfurter's fear of the open-ended nature of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as one of the reasons for his opposition to using it as a vehicle for in-
corporation in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1997) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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people," it does not in its text provide any guidelines for ascer-
taining what those rights might be.3 4
As a practical matter, it really does not matter if the protection
of unenumerated rights is located in the Due Process Clause, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, or the Ninth Amendment; the
concept is the same: There are certain things that are beyond the
power of governments to do. Whether this is because these things
transgress on the rights "retained by the people,"5 the "privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States," 3 or the "Law of
the Land"7 that serves as the foundation for "due process,"8
makes little interpretive difference. The key is determining how
to effectively protect unenumerated rights.
Many prestigious scholars in the field of unenumerated rights
have issued calls to abandon substantive due process in favor of
other methods of judicially protecting unenumerated rights. 9
However, each of these methods had the disadvantage of requir-
ing the Court to embrace an essentially new doctrine and enact a
wholesale change in jurisprudence. Substantive due process, on
the other hand, is in use now. It is not that substantive due
process is a better way to protect unenumerated rights than the
Ninth Amendment or the Privileges or Immunities Clause; ra-
ther, it is simply another way to get to the same result. Its cur-
rent advantage lies in the fact that it is the one actually used by
the Court, and that this usage is likely to continue.40 Therefore, if
unenumerated rights are to be protected, and the Ninth Amend-
ment's command that the rights retained by the people are not to
be disparaged, substantive due process needs to be fixed.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. IX; Jeffrey D. Jackson, Blackstone's Ninth Amendment: A
Historical Common Law Baseline for the Interpretation of Unenumerated Rights, 62 OKLA.
L. REV. 167, 168 (2010).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
37. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
39. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION
OF LIBERTY 259-69 (2004) (advocating a "presumption of liberty" approach); Niles, supra
note 2, at 135-43 (advocating replacing substantive due process with an approach based
on Lockean concepts of personal autonomy).
40. See Richard B. Saphire, Doris Day's Constitution, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1443, 1469-
70 (2000) (noting that "it is difficult to imagine anything less probable in the modern world
of constitutional jurisprudence than the prospect that the Court . . . will repudiate its
substantive due process doctrine').
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III. GETTING TO THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM:
How WE GOT HERE
To understand why substantive due process is broken, it is ne-
cessary to look at the way courts, and the Supreme Court in par-
ticular, developed its doctrine and the doctrine of unenumerated
rights. A look at the history reveals that, while the concept of un-
enumerated rights as a counterbalance to governmental power
has a long pedigree in both American and English law, the con-
cept is a continually evolving one.
A. The Colonial View of Substantive Due Process
Embedded in the ideas of constitutional law brought to Ameri-
ca by the colonists was the notion that there were traditional
rights that could not be infringed on by government, even if most
Americans weren't exactly sure what those rights were.4 1 By the
time of the framing of the Constitution and the adoption of the
Bill of Rights, the popular concept of rights was that set forth in
William Blackstone's Commentaries.42
According to Blackstone, the traditional and customary abso-
lute rights of the individual were: (1) the right of personal securi-
ty, that is the right to enjoyment of life, limb, health and reputa-
tion; (2) the right of personal liberty to move freely from place to
place and profession to profession, without confinement; and (3)
the right of private property, which is the free use, enjoyment,
and disposal of all acquisitions. These rights, however, were not
absolute in all applications.44 Rather, they [w]ere bound by 'the
laws of the land,' that is, by the valid laws enacted to protect and
regulate society."45 However, the valid laws were not all laws.46
Instead, they were only "those laws that comport[ed] with 'the
law of the land."'47
41. Jackson, supra note 34, at 176.
42. Id. at 200-01.
43. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125-41.
44. Id. at * 119.
45. Jackson, supra note 34, at 208; see 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at *119-20,
*134, *140.
46. Jackson, supra note 34, at 208.
47. Id.; see 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at *124.
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The first commandment of a valid law was that it could not be
"arbitrary."48 This concept of nonarbitrariness was a fundamental
one in English law.49 While we today tend to think of the term ar-
bitrary as randomness or caprice, arbitrariness at the time had a
more specific constitutional meaning. It meant rule unbounded by
traditional law and rights; the opposite of rule of law.5o This pro-
hibition extended even to Parliament, and constrained its power.5 1
Of course, in a constitutional system without judicial review, this
did not mean that Parliament could not enact arbitrary laws, but
rather that those laws were not proper laws because they lacked
legitimacy.52
According to Blackstone, for a law not to be arbitrary it must
instead be "reasonable."5 Blackstone thought a law was reasona-
ble if it advanced the public good, for then it increased rather
than restrained liberty by benefiting the civil society that pro-
tected liberty. 1 In interpreting Blackstone:
Reasonableness [was] not the only test of a law's validity, however.
The absolute rights of an individual [could] be restrained only "so
far ... (and no farther) as is necessary" for the needs of civil society.
The idea [was] to find the correct balance between the liberty of the
individual and the needs of society, and the key to this determina-
48. Jackson, supra note 34, at 208; see 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at *129-32.
49. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at *129-32.
50. See REID, supra note 22, at 41.
51. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at *129 (noting that laws directing the
punishment of light and trivial offenses by death were arbitrary). Blackstone's use of arbi-
trariness is interesting because Blackstone's Commentaries straddled the line between the
old English concept of due process as a constraint on Parliament and the new British con-
cept of due process being whatever Parliament enacted. See Jackson, supra note 34, at
209. Although Blackstone's Commentaries came down squarely on the side of parliamenta-
ry supremacy as a whole, they contained some language that echoed the old concept of due
process. Id.
52. See Jackson, supra note 34, at 178, 211.
53. See id. at 208.
54. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at *126. By way of contrast, a law that re-
strained conduct without any good aim was destructive of liberty. Id. Blackstone used the
statute of Edward IV prohibiting the wearing of pikes of more than two inches in length on
the boots of those persons who were under the rank of lord as an example of an arbitrary
law, because such a prohibition served no public purpose. Id. at *122. However, he cited
the prescription of Charles II that all persons were to be buried in woolen garments as an
example of a reasonable law, in that it advanced the governmental objective of benefitting
the wool trade. Id. Although this may seem to be a low threshold for public benefit, the
wool trade was of vital economic importance to Great Britain, and the degree to which its
protection was a matter of public interest should not be understated. Id.
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tion [was] custom and tradition. Thus, there [were] traditional and
customary limitations on what government [could] do.ss
It is important to emphasize that rights as understood by the
Framing generation were not absolutes, nor was every right
claimed as important as every other. For instance, while there
was an absolute right to private property, not all property and its
uses were equal. Property could not be taken away completely,
unless for a true public purpose and with compensation.56 Howev-
er, there were several ways in which the uses of property could be
regulated to various degrees: In Blackstone's England, the law
restricted "offences against public trade" such as forestalling the
market by buying merchandise on the way to market, or regrat-
ing, that is, reselling merchandise in the same market.57 The ex-
tent to which any particular right existed depended upon the sit-
uation. But the rights existed as limits.
What emerged, then, was a sort of means-ends doctrine. To be
valid rather than arbitrary, the law had to have a proper end;
that is, one which was a valid thing for government to regulate.8
Further, the means had to be reasonable and not infringe on cus-
tomary rights." Laws that did not fit this test were considered to
be arbitrary assertions of power, even if there was no court that
could pronounce them so. 60
This idea of limits on governmental power imposed by reasona-
bleness and customary rights was imported by the colonists to
America, and by the time of the Revolution, had a much more ro-
bust interpretation than in Great Britain at the time. Where Brit-
ish law had moved toward accepting Parliamentary supremacy,
men like James Otis and John Adams could still argue the Amer-
ican view that Parliament's actions were limited by the "law of
the land," and that the Navigation Acts and the Stamp Act were
therefore invalid.61
55. Jackson, supra note 34, at 208-09 (citing 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at *121).
56. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, *138-39.
57. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *158-59; see also FORREST MCDONALD,
Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 14-36 (1985)
(describing the various ways in which property might be taken or regulated).
58. Jackson, supra note 34, at 208 (citing 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43, at *724-25).
59. Id. at 209.
60. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
61. RODNEY L. Morr, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 125-36 (1926).
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B. The Development of Doctrine
This undercurrent of arbitrary and unreasonable actions of
government as contrary to due process ran through the law in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as well, although
it was only rarely stated.6 2 Much of the mention of due process
during this time had to do with procedure rather than sub-
stance." Nevertheless, the idea that there were substantive limits
to governmental action found expression in the doctrine against
impairment of vested property rights. 64 It was not until the latter
half of the nineteenth century that substantive due process, as we
currently understand it, coalesced into a vital form in American
law.
Some popular accounts of substantive due process mark its in-
ception from the infamous case of Dred Scott v. Sandford,65 as if
merely linking substantive due process to that case rather than
its roots in Magna Carta makes the whole concept illegitimate.66
It is true that Justice Taney's opinion spoke of prohibiting slavery
in the territories of the Missouri Compromise as a violation of the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.67 However, this is really
just a continuation of the "vested property rights" line of due
process jurisprudence that was well established in American law
by that time.6 1 It really has little to do with the concept of un-
62. See Charles Grove Haines, Due Process of Law After the Civil War, in 1 SELECTED
ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at 268.
63. See Corwin, supra note 10, at 370-73. Some state courts did express the concept
that the various due process and law of the land provisions in their state constitutions
were hedges against arbitrary legislation. See, e.g., Dunn v. City Council of Charleston, 16
S.C.L. (Harp.) 189, 199 (S.C. Const. Ct. App. 1824) ("Various opinions have been enter-
tained of the meaning of those words, 'the law of the land,' but all the commentators have
considered them as intending, in some way or other, to operate as a check upon the exer-
cise of arbitrary power.").
64. See Charles M. Hough, Due Process of Law-To-Day, in 1 SELECTED ESSAYS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at 302, 306-07.
65. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
66. See BORK, supra note 11, at 32 ("Who says Roe must say Lochner and Scott."); Da-
vid P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Article IV and Federal Powers,
1836-1864, 1983 DUKE L.J. 695, 736 & n.262 (stating that Dred Scott was "at least very
possibly the first application of substantive due process in the Supreme Court, . . . [and
was] the original precedent for Lochner v. New York and Roe v. Wade").
67. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 451-52 ('The right to traffic in [slavery] ... was guarantied
[sic] to the citizens of the United States, in [any] State that might desire it, for twenty
years. And the Government in express terms is pledged to protect it in all future time, if
the slave escapes from his owner.").
68. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott,
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enumerated rights and liberties, or the Due Process Clause as
protection against arbitrary governmental action.69 Further, if
pedigree is somehow important, supporters of substantive due
process could just as easily cite the arguments made by abolition-
ists such as Samuel Chase during the same time period-that by
recognizing slavery in the territories, the federal government was
denying slaves their right to freedom in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.70 Although the Court did
not adopt this theory, the argument "formed the centerpiece of
antislavery constitutional doctrine, appearing in every antisla-
very party platform between 1844 and 1860."n7
Due process as a hedge against arbitrary governmental action
and interference with liberty moved from a latent background as-
sumption to the forefront after the Fourteenth Amendment ap-
plied it to state enactments. Its progress was gradual, with the
Court in the Slaughter-House Cases dismissing the butchers' due
process argument with the brief comment that
it is sufficient to say that under no construction of that provision
that we have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible, can the re-
straint imposed by the State of Louisiana upon the exercise of their
trade by the butchers of New Orleans be held to be a deprivation of
property within the meaning of [the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment]."
However, at the same time, the Court was setting out the begin-
nings of its unenumerated rights jurisprudence in Loan Associa-
tion v. Topeka.73 In that case, the Court, although not referencing
82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 49, 74 (2007).
69. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Story of Dred Scott: Originalism's Forgotten
Past, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAw STORIES 78-80 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) (critiquing the
"Dred Again" arguments).
70. See, e.g., SALMON P. CHASE, THE ADDRESS AND REPLY ON THE PRESENTATION OF A
TESTIMONIAL TO S.P. CHASE BY THE COLORED PEOPLE OF CINCINNATI WITH SOME
ACCOUNT OF THE CASE OF SAMUEL WATSON 29-30 (1845); see also EARL M. MALTZ, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 8 (2003) (referencing
Chase's argument).
71. MALTZ, supra note 70, at 8.
72. 83 U.S. 36, 80-81 (1872). Much of the Court's opinion in the Slaughter-House Cas-
es centered on the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The Due Process argument was "not
... much pressed" by the litigants. Id. at 80; see Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L. REV. 643, 647 (1909). In dissent, Justice Brad-
ley argued that "a law which prohibits a large class of citizens from adopting a lawful em-
ployment, or from following a lawful employment previously adopted, does deprive them of
liberty as well as property, without due process of law." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at
122 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
73. 87 U.S. 655 (1874).
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due process, nevertheless applied the classic "public purpose" re-
quirement in finding that the city's issuance of bonds to benefit
private bridge builders was void.7 4 In so doing, the Court, through
Justice Miller, the author of the Slaughter-House Cases, 75 noted:
It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free govern-
ment beyond the control of the State. A government which recog-
nized no such rights, which held the lives, the liberty, and the prop-
erty of its citizens subject at all times to the absolute disposition and
unlimited control of even the most democratic depository of power, is
after all but a despotism."
Over the next few years, the idea that due process could be in-
voked as a protection against arbitrary legislation appears to
have been assumed by courts, but its parameters were uncertain.
In Munn v. Illinois, the argument of the plaintiffs was that legis-
lation fixing the maximum prices for grain storage violated due
process because it was beyond the power of the state.77 The Court
rejected this argument in deference to Illinois's judgment that the
property in question was affected with a public interest, but noted
that "[i]f no state of circumstances could exist to justify such a
statute, then we may declare this one void, because in excess of
the legislative power of the State."78
Similarly, in Davidson v. New Orleans, wherein the Court ad-
dressed the constitutionality of an assessment of taxes on real es-
tate in Louisiana, Justice Miller cited the long history of due
process as a restriction on governmental action, but attempted to
tread carefully regarding its actual application.7 He stated that
there existed "some strange misconception" that the Due Process
Clause was "a means of bringing to the test of the decision of this
court the abstract opinions of every unsuccessful litigant in a
State court of the justice of the decision against him, and of the
merits of the legislation on which such a decision may be
founded."8 0 He further noted:
If, therefore, it were possible to define what it is for a State to de-
prive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
74. Id. at 664-65.
75. 83 U.S. at 57.
76. Loan Ass'n, 87 U.S. at 662.
77. 94 U.S. 113, 123 (1876).
78. Id. at 130, 132-33.
79. 96 U.S. 97, 102, 104 (1877).
80. Id. at 104.
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in terms which would cover every exercise of power thus forbidden to
the State, and exclude those which are not, no more useful construc-
tion could be furnished by this or any other court to any part of the
fundamental law [,]st
but stated that the wiser course would be to rely on "the gradual
process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented
for decision shall require, with the reasoning on which such deci-
sions may be founded."8 2
There were other rumblings of substantive due process during
this time period, but they provided no clear doctrine. 3 At the
same time, the Court refused to use the Due Process Clause as an
opportunity to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states.14
Although the foundations for the doctrine of substantive due
process were laid during this time, the doctrine itself would not
take shape until the late 1880s."1
The doctrine came in Mugler v. Kansas, wherein the Court ad-
dressed whether a legislature could rightly prohibit the manufac-
ture and sale of liquor for personal use. The plaintiffs in Mugler
argued that such a regulation was beyond the power of the state
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Although the Court invalidated
the ordinances in question because of their discriminatory nature, it went on to state that
[T]he fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, consi-
dered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitution-
al law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race
in securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and
equal laws . . . for the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his
life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of
life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where
freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.
Id. at 370. The role of Yick Wo v. Hopkins in the development of due process is open to
some debate. Some commentators have argued that Yick Wo is the first example of Loch-
ner-like substantive due process protecting economic rights. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Un-
explainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts About Yick Wo, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1373.
Still others have argued that it was primarily an equal protection case that had little im-
pact on the development of the doctrine. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Revisiting Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1393, 1399. The most that can probably be said about Yick
Wo was that it helped advance the idea of the Due Process Clause as a substantive barrier
to arbitrary exercises of state power. MALTZ, supra note 70, at 111-12 (arguing that the
clear implication of the Yick Wo analysis was that the Fourteenth Amendment would be a
barrier to arbitrary substantive action as well as procedural action).
84. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
85. Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the
States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 492 (1997).
86. 123 U.S. 623, 653 (1887).
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and therefore a violation of due process.8 1 In its analysis, the
Court, through Justice Harlan, set forth the general rules. He
recognized that the legislature was the proper authority to "de-
termine, primarily, what measures are appropriate or needful for
the protection of the public morals, the public health, or the pub-
lic safety."88 However, he noted:
It does not at all follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for the
promotion of these ends, is to be accepted as a legitimate exertion of
the police powers of the State. There are, of necessity, limits beyond
which legislation cannot rightfully go. While every possible pre-
sumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of a statute, the
courts must obey the Constitution rather than the law-making de-
partment of government, and must, upon their own responsibility,
determine whether, in any particular case, these limits have been
passed."
The Court then stated the forerunner of the rational basis test:
If... a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public
health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or sub-
stantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights
secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so ad-
judge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution."
Even after announcing this test, however, the Court went on to
hold that the statute had a real relation to the protection of the
public safety from the effects of intoxicating liquors.8'
87. Id. at 660.
88. Id. at 661.
89. Id. (citing Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 661-62. The Court concluded that it
is difficult to perceive any ground for the judiciary to declare that the prohibi-
tion by Kansas of the manufacture or sale, within her limits, of intoxicating
liquors for general use there as a beverage, is not fairly adapted to the end of
protecting the community against the evils which confessedly result from the
excessive use of ardent spirits. There is no justification for holding that the
State, under the guise merely of police regulations, is here aiming to deprive
the citizen of his constitutional rights; for we cannot shut out of view the fact,
within the knowledge of all, that the public health, the public morals, and the
public safety, may be endangered by the general use of intoxicating drinks;
nor the fact established by statistics accessible to every one, that the idleness,
disorder, pauperism, and crime existing in the country, are, in some degree at
least, traceable to this evil.. .. Nor can it be said that government interferes
with or impairs any one's constitutional rights of liberty or of property, when
it determines that the manufacture and sale of intoxicating drinks, for gener-
al or individual use, as a beverage, are, or may become, hurtful to society,
and constitute, therefore, a business in which no one may lawfully engage.
Id. at 661-63.
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The test announced in Mugler was applied the next year in
upholding a statute making it illegal to sell or possess to sell
oleomargarine.2 The Court brushed aside the petitioners' offer of
proof that their particular oleomargarine products were whole-
some, stating instead that: "It is entirely consistent with that of-
fer that many, indeed, that most kinds of oleomargarine butter in
the market contain ingredients that are or may become injurious
to health. The court cannot say, from anything of which it may
take judicial cognizance, that such is not the fact."93
The rule of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, as
announced by Mugler and practiced by the Supreme Court, was
one which presumed the validity of the legislative act in question,
and placed the burden on the challenger of the law to show its
unconstitutionality. 94 Further, facts supporting the statute were
presumed to exist.95 However, the Court reserved for itself the fi-
nal question over whether the state law was reasonably related to
the public welfare, or whether it was instead arbitrary.9 6 A chal-
lenger could always rebut the presumption of constitutionality by
presenting facts showing that the law was not reasonably related
to the public welfare, or unreasonably infringed on rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution.97 The test for validity of federal regula-
tion under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was
presumed to be the same, with the inquiry being whether the act
was a reasonable exercise of a federal power, or transgressed
some right guaranteed by the Constitution.98 Under this test, the
92. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 679, 683, 684 (1888) (citing Mugler, 123
U.S. at 623).
93. Id. at 684.
94. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 392-93 (1895); Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661 (citing
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. at 718).
95. Sweet, 159 U.S. at 393 (citations omitted).
96. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661.
97. Id.
98. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-80 (1908) (holding that a federal statute
criminalizing the discharge of employees for joining a labor union was not a valid exercise
of the Commerce Clause and violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because
it unreasonably deprived the defendant employer of personal liberty and property). The
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause was not often invoked during this time. See MOrr,
supra note 61, at 204-05; Walter F. Dodd, Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in
Constitutional Law, in 1 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at
353-54. According to Professor Dodd, the reasons for this may include: (1) the fact that
states have more general powers than the federal government; (2) the fact that state laws
are subject to review from both state and federal courts; (3) the inherent distrust of state
legislatures by state and federal courts; and (4) the greater pressure upon those courts to
apply constitutional limitations on state enactments. Id. at 352-54.
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Court took upon itself the task of exercising a substantive review
of both the ends that the legislation purported to meet as well as
the means by which it purported to meet them.
The application of these principles generally resulted in the
state or federal law at issue being upheld. From 1887 to 1912, the
Supreme Court decided ninety-eight cases in which it considered
the validity of substantive social or economic legislation under
the Due Process Clause.9 Of these, the legislation was held to be
constitutional in ninety-two cases, and overturned in only sev-
en. 0 These seven cases, more so than the ones in which the Court
upheld the legislation in question, are instructive in showing the
Court's reasoning process during this time. In six of them, the
Court overturned the statute using what would become the two
dominant forces of substantive due process: (1) the protection
against arbitrary legislation,1oi and (2) the jurisprudence of un-
enumerated fundamental rights.10 2
In Dobbins v. Los Angeles, the Court considered the validity of
a statute that barred the building of gas works outside of a cer-
tain area. 03 The plaintiff had secured a permit within the privi-
leged area and was in the process of building when the city coun-
cil amended the statute so that the plaintiffs property was
outside of the permitted area.'04 In analyzing the case, the Court
admitted that
99. Ray A. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40
HARV. L. REV. 943, 944 (1927). In an earlier article, Charles Warren had put the number
as 560 cases between 1887 and 1911. Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the United
States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 295 (1913). However, Warren counted
many cases that actually fit under the Equal Protection Clause, contained only procedural
due process questions, or were concerned with taxation, eminent domain and rate regula-
tion, thus making Brown's count a more accurate guide of substantive due process. Brown,
supra note 99, at 944 n.7 (explaining his methodology).
100. See Brown, supra note 99, at 944 & n.8 (citations omitted). Brown actually lists
six, but he does not include Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), which is also a case
where the Court overturned the legislation in question under the Due Process Clause. See
Warren, supra note 99, at 295 (listing Allgeyer).
101. See St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354, 359 (1912);
Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 239 (1904).
102. See Adair, 208 U.S. at 173-74; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905); All-
geyer, 165 U.S. at 578.
103. 195 U.S. 223, 234 (1904).
104. Id. at 224-25. The plaintiff alleged that the ordinance was modified at the insis-
tence of the Los Angeles Lighting Company, which had a monopoly on gasworks in the
area. Id. at 225.
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every intendment is to be made in favor of the lawfulness of the ex-
ercise of municipal power, making regulations to promote the public
health and safety, and that it is not the province of courts, except in
clear cases, to interfere with the exercise of the power reposed by law
in municipal corporations for the protection of local rights and the
health and welfare of the people in the community."o'
However, the court stated
[N]otwithstanding this general rule of the law, it is now thoroughly
well settled by decisions of this court that municipal by-laws and or-
dinances, and even legislative enactments undertaking to regulate
useful business enterprises, are subject to investigation in the courts
with a view to determining whether the law or ordinance is a lawful
exercise of the police power, or whether under the guise of enforcing
police regulations there has been an unwarranted and arbitrary in-
terference with the constitutional rights to carry on a lawful busi-
ness, to make contracts, or to use and enjoy property.'o
The Court in Dobbins did not fall back on the doctrine of vested
property rights. Rather, it admitted that even though the plaintiff
had already invested money and completed considerable con-
struction, the city still had the power to regulate her use of the
property for health, safety, or welfare reasons.'07 Instead, the
Court analyzed the alleged reason for the ordinance, public safe-
ty, and held that it was not reasonably related to the change in
the statute because the area in which the plaintiff was to build
was no different than the new permitted area.08 The Court also
noted that while, in general, it did not inquire into the actual mo-
tives of legislation, it would take motives into account when the
facts revealed that the purpose was unlawful or discriminatory. 00
105. Id. at 235-36.
106. Id. at 236.
107. Id. at 238. The Court noted that
notwithstanding the grant of the permit, and even after the erection of the
works, the city might still, for the protection of the public health and safety,
prohibit the further maintenance and continuance of such works, and the
prosecution of the business, originally harmless, may become, by reason of
the manner of its prosecution or a changed condition of the community, a
menace to the public health and safety. In other words, the right to exercise
the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful to-day may in the
future, because of the changed situation, the growth of population or other
causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to
yield to the public good.
Id. at 238-39 (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 239-40.
109. Id. at 240.
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In St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Co. v.
Wynne, the Court also overturned a statute mandating that a
railroad either pay within thirty days the demand of a livestock
owner for livestock killed by a train, or be liable for double the
amount eventually awarded by a jury, plus attorneys' fees."o The
Court held that the statute was not a reasonable way to secure its
avowed purpose, which was the prompt settlement of just de-
mands, but was rather an arbitrary penalty for failing to accede
to extravagant demands."'
In both Dobbins and Wynne, the Court followed the standard
method of analyzing legislation for arbitrariness: the legislation
was given the presumption of constitutionality, and the test was
whether the legislation was reasonably related to the permissible
end that it was designed to achieve." This is in line with the pro-
cedure prescribed in Mugler. However, in three other cases dur-
ing this time period, the Court suggested that some other test
might apply where legislation was challenged as violating certain
fundamental rights.
The first of these cases was Allgeyer v. Louisiana, which dealt
with a statute construed to prohibit a Louisiana citizen from con-
tracting for marine insurance with a New York insurance compa-
ny not licensed to do business in the state."' In considering this
question, the Court set out a broad definition of "liberty" under
due process, stating:
The liberty mentioned in [the Fourteenth Amendment] means, not
only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical re-
straint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to
embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his
faculties, to be free to use them in all lawful ways, to live and work
where he will, to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue
any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carry-
ing out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned." 4
110. 224 U.S. 354, 358 (1912).
111. Id. at 359-60. Part of the Court's opinion hinged on the fact that the plaintiff re-
ceived only $400 in damages from the jury, while the initial demand had been $500. Id. at
359.
112. Id. at 359-60; Dobbins, 195 U.S. at 238-40.
113. 165 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1897).
114. Id. at 589.
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The Court held that while the freedom to make contracts in pur-
suit of business was subject to reasonable state restrictions, such
restrictions could not extend to prohibiting the making of con-
tracts outside of the state's jurisdiction.'
Allgeyer straddled the line between a traditional means-ends
arbitrariness review and what would become a fundamental
rights standard. The opinion said nothing about the presumption
of reasonableness, but also stopped short of holding that the li-
berties it declared had some sort of special status in the due
process calculus.116 That would change just eight years later, how-
ever, when, in Lochner v. New York, the Court transformed All-
geyer's right to enter into proper, necessary, and essential con-
tracts into the unenumerated right of "liberty of contract." "
C. Lochner and Liberty of Contract
Lochner is one of the most commented-on opinions in history.
Although scholars have many different interpretations of exactly
what the Court's motivations were in striking down New York's
wage and hour legislation for bakeshops,"5 Lochner's significance
for substantive due process is that it represents the beginning of
fundamental rights jurisprudence as we know it today."9 In some
ways, Lochner looks like a traditional means-ends arbitrariness
analysis, with the question being whether the act had a relation
115. Id. at 591.
116. See David N. Mayer, The Myth of "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism": Liberty of
Contract During the Lochner Era, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 217, 259 (2009). Mayer notes
that the liberty of contract as stated in Allgeyer was actually quite moderate, in that it
was the freedom to pursue a lawful calling through lawful means, subject to reasonable
legal constraints. Id.
117. James W. Ely, Jr., "To Pursue Any Lawful Trade or Avocation"- The Evolution of
Unenumerated Economic Rights in the Nineteenth Century, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 917, 947-
48 (2006) (discussing that liberty of contract as a fundamental right was connected to the
established right to pursue a lawful vocation).
118. See, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE
OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 1-18 (1993) (arguing that Lochner was
the result of an opposition to class legislation); FRANK R. STRONG, SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS OF LAW: A DICHOTOMY OF SENSE AND NONSENSE 95 (1986) (arguing that Lochner
was a product of Social Darwinism); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM L.
REV. 873, 873-75 (1987) (arguing that the Lochner Court's motivation was based on preex-
isting common law norms).
119. See generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism Revised: Lochner and
the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003) (arguing that
Lochner is best understood in the context of the Court's fundamental rights jurispru-
dence).
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to promoting the health, safety, and welfare of the public. 120 How-
ever, the Court in Lochner made a crucial change to the calculus:
Rather than presume the statute in question to be constitutional,
the Court reversed the presumption to favor liberty of contract.121
Although not explicitly stating so, the Court clearly placed the
burden on the state to justify the legislation as a labor or health
law, and the state's failure to do so led to the law's demise.122
Lochner was followed soon after by Adair v. United States.123 In
that case, interpreting the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause rather than the Fourteenth's, the Court struck down a
federal criminal statute prohibiting the discharge of an employee
for joining a labor organization.124 In making this determination,
the Court followed the analysis from Lochner: first holding that
the law infringed on liberty of contract, and then requiring the
government to justify the intrusion by, in this case, showing that
the statute was a proper regulation of interstate commerce.125
Thus, by the end of 1912, the Supreme Court's substantive due
process jurisprudence had evolved along the two lines that mark
such jurisprudence today. Ordinary legislative enactments chal-
lenged as a deprivation of liberty or property, as in Dobbins and
Wynne, were subject to the classic arbitrariness formula, whereby
the legislative enactment was presumed to be constitutional and
the burden placed on the challenger to show that the legislative
scheme bore no relation to a legitimate governmental purpose.126
However, certain legislation that infringed on special liberties-
such as the liberty of contract-was subject to a different stan-
dard; one in which the presumption was switched to the liberty
interest, and the burden placed on the government to establish
the legitimacy of the legislation. To be sure, the difference was
120. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905).
121. Id. at 56; David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v. New York, in CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW STORIES, supra note 69, at 344 (noting the presumption in favor of liberty of
contract); Robert E. Cushman, The Social and Economic Interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in 2 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 19, at 70; May-
er, supra note 116, at 258 (noting that the Lochner standard created a moderate presump-
tion in favor of liberty).
122. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64-65.
123. 208 U.S. 161, 161 (1908).
124. Id. at 180.
125. Id. at 172, 176.
126. See St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354, 359 (1912);
Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 236, 239-40 (1904).
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minor, because the Court generally made a substantive inquiry as
to whether the legislation actually bore a relation to a legitimate
governmental purpose, and the government could always over-
come the presumption of liberty of contract by showing that the
legislation did further some legitimate governmental purpose.127
As the Court's doctrine of substantive due process evolved, so
did its concept of what evidence would suffice to support legisla-
tion. The Court's decision in Lochner is often criticized for ignor-
ing evidence that would have shown that the bakeshop legislation
served a health purpose.128 Lost in this criticism is the fact that no
such evidence was presented to the Court, either in the record be-
low or in the briefs.12 9 It is true that the Court during this time
period tended to be somewhat mechanical in that it tended to fa-
vor abstract legal theory over actual facts.' For example, the
Court in Adair assumed an equality in the ability to bargain for
contract between the employer and employee, even though reality
showed that this was not the case.' However, by 1912 counsel to
the Court had begun to present, and the Court to listen to, actual
evidence on the social and economic need for legislation.132 In Mul-
ler v. Oregon, a case decided a bare three years after Lochner, and
less than a month after Adair, the Court took judicial notice of
the "general knowledge" of the danger to the health of women
127. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420-23 (1908) (discussing the relation-
ship between the minimum hours law and health of women).
128. See, e.g., Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARV. L.
REV. 495, 502-03 (1908); Dean M. Hashimoto, Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law,
76 OR. L. REV. 111, 138 (1997) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59, 70-71 (1905));
Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 480 (1909).
129. Bernstein, supra note 121, at 345-46. The criticism of the Court tends to track the
dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan, wherein he cited medical treatises and statistics
showing that the trade of baking was unhealthy. However, it is not known where Harlan
got this information. Id. at 346. Writing in 1922, Robert E. Cushman noted that "[t]here
was certainly little in the briefs of counsel in the [early due process] cases to inspire the
courts to take a liberal view of questions of constitutionality in close cases." Cushman, su-
pra note 121, at 74 n.50.
130. See Cushman, supra note 121, at 71.
131. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908). The Court stated that
the right of the employe[e] to quit the service of the employer, for whatever
reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dis-
pense with the services of such employe[e]. . . . In all such particulars the
employer and the employe[e] have equality of right, and any legislation that
disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract
which no government can legally justify in a free land.
Id.
132. See Cushman, supra note 121, at 73 (citing Felix Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and
Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1916)).
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from working long hours presented to it in the plaintiffs' brief,
and upheld Oregon's minimum hours law. 33
From 1913 to 1920 the Court decided ninety-seven cases re-
garding substantive due process, and in only five of them was the
legislation overturned.14 In Adams v. Tanner, the Court applied
the standard test for arbitrary legislation in overturning a Wash-
ington statute forbidding employment agencies from charging a
fee from persons seeking employment.15 Liberty of contract was
involved in two of those cases, but the Court struggled to apply a
consistent test. In Smith v. Texas, the Court reversed a conviction
under a statute making it a misdemeanor to act as a railway con-
ductor without having served two years as a freight conductor or
brakeman.136 Although the Court did not explicitly set out a test,
it appears to have applied a mild presumption in favor of liberty
of contract and right to employment.'3 Similarly, in Coppage v.
Kansas, decided five months later, the Court, although recogniz-
ing a "strong general presumption in favor of the validity of state
laws," placed the burden on the state to justify as a legitimate ex-
ercise of power a statute punishing an employer for requiring as a
condition of employment that an employee not join a labor un-
ion.'3 However, in Bunting v. Oregon, a case in which the Court
upheld a maximum-hours law quite similar to the one at issue in
133. 208 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1908). The Court stated:
The legislation and opinions referred to in the margin may not be, technically
speaking, authorities, and in them is little or no discussion of the constitu-
tional question presented to us for determination, yet they are significant of a
widespread belief that woman's physical structure, and the functions she per-
forms in consequence thereof, justify special legislation restricting or qualify-
ing the conditions under which she should be permitted to toil.
Id. at 420.
134. See Brown, supra note 99, at 944. Brown contends that there were actually seven
cases in which the legislation was overturned on this basis, listing: Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U.S. 60 (1917); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917); McFarland v. American Sugar
Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1 (1915); Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914); and Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul Ry. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165 (1914). Id. at 944 n.9. However, both McFarland and Truax
were really decided on equal protection grounds. McFarland, 241 U.S. at 86; Truax, 239
U.S. at 41-43.
135. Tanner, 244 U.S. at 595-96 (quoting McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 547
(1909)).
136. 233 U.S. at 635-36, 642.
137. Id. at 636-41. In addition, Justice Joseph Lamar, the author of the opinion, ap-
pears to have leaned heavily on his personal knowledge of the railway business in finding
no justification for the law. Id. at 640 n.1.
138. 236 U.S. at 14.
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Lochner, the Court appears to have applied a presumption in the
other direction, requiring the challenger to show that the statute
was unconstitutional.'
The Court also began to extend its "special liberties" jurispru-
dence from freedom of contract to other liberties. In Buchanan v.
Warley, the Court struck down an ordinance promoting segrega-
tion in housing. 0 In doing so, the Court applied a Lochner-like
analysis, first holding that the law denied freedom of property
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and then holding that it was
not justified by state police power.m14
During the 1920s the Court entered the so-called "heyday" of
Lochner-era due process jurisprudence.142 During this time period,
the Court struck down more statutes for violations of substantive
due process than ever before. 43 Nevertheless, the Court still
upheld far more statutes against due process challenges than it
struck down.144 The cases during this time period reflect a further
development of the different strains of due process, but also re-
flect the continuing confusion over the test.
In cases such as Adkins v. Children's Hospital and Chas. Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, the Court made clear
what had before only been hinted: the standard really had
shifted, at least where liberty of contract was concerned.15 Rather
than presume constitutionality and examine the legislation for a
reasonable relation to a permissible end, "[fireedom of contract
[was now] the general rule, and restraint the exception."l46 Gov-
ernment could only abridge this freedom in "exceptional" circums-
tances, such as where the business regulated was affected with a
public interest. 14 Where the statute involved did not fall within
139. 243 U.S. 426, 434-39 (1917).
140. 245 U.S. 60, 70, 82 (1917).
141. Id. at 73-82; see also David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk:
Buchanan v. Warley in Historical Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 797, 873-74 (1998) (con-
necting Lochner and Buchanan with other civil liberties cases).
142. Bernstein, supra note 119, at 10-11 (identifying the different periods of the Court
during the Lochner era).
143. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 616.
144. See id.
145. Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 534 (1923);
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923).
146. Chas. Wolff, 262 U.S. at 534; see Adkins, 261 U.S. at 546.
147. Chas. Wolff, 262 U.S. at 534; see Adkins, 261 U.S. at 546. The Court in Adkins
identified these exceptional circumstances as including statutes: (1) "fixing rates and
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these narrow exceptions, it was declared to violate due process.148
Within these categories, however, the Court upheld a broad varie-
ty of restrictions on liberty of contract.14 9
Outside the liberty of contract area, the Court applied a means-
ends analysis to judge the constitutionality of the legislation, al-
though not always with a consistent standard. In some cases, the
Court applied a presumption of constitutionality,so while in oth-
ers, no mention was made of the test.51
The Court also expanded due process liberty to encompass oth-
er civil liberties.152 In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court struck down a
state law banning the teaching of languages other than English
until after the eighth grade.113 In an opinion by Justice McRey-
nolds, the Court held in sweeping fashion that the liberty in the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
included
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the in-
dividual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and generally to enjoy the privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men."'
In holding that the legislation unlawfully infringed on the occu-
pational opportunity of teachers, the opportunities of pupils to
charges [for] businesses impressed with a public interest;" (2) "relating to contracts for the
performance of public work;" (3) "prescribing the character, methods and time for payment
of wages;" and (4) "fixing hours of labor." 261 U.S. at 546-48.
148. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
149. See, e.g., Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U.S. 540, 540-41 (1925) (upholding state law limit-
ing amounts attorneys could charge in workers' compensation cases); Radice v. New York,
264 U.S. 292, 294-95, 298 (1924) (upholding state law prohibiting nighttime employment
of women in restaurants located in large cities).
150. See, e.g., Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 421-22, 426 (1923)
(upholding law extending workers' compensation liability for employees injured going to
workplace); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 548 (1922) (upholding state law
that required employers to grant request from departing employees for letter of reference
stating particulars of employment and reasons for leaving).
151. See, e.g., James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119, 123-24
(1927) (upholding statute expanding state fraud liability to false promises justified under
principles of common law); Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230-31 (1920) (law requir-
ing payment of dog license fee to private humane society justified because dog ownership
was an "imperfect" property right).
152. Bernstein, supra note 119, at 49.
153. 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
154. Id. at 399 (citations omitted).
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acquire knowledge, and the power of parents to control their
children's education, the Court applied a means-ends test.155 The
Court noted that the purported end, to ensure a ready under-
standing of English, was perhaps desirable, but stated that the
means adopted exceeded the power of the state.156
The Court in Meyer did not purport to apply the same test that
it would use for liberty of contract.15 7 However, the Court clearly
applied a standard akin to the ones in Lochner and Buchanan v.
Warley. Once the regulation was found to infringe upon a right
the Court classified as "fundamental," the burden shifted to the
State to justify the intrusion.' 8
Meyer was soon followed by a number of other cases extending
protection to civil liberties.159 In many of those cases, the Court's
review followed the same pattern as in Meyer by requiring the
State to justify the intrusion on rights.60
D. Decline of Liberty of Contract
By the 1930s, however, the special presumption in favor of li-
berty of contract was already fading in the face of an expansive
definition of the "affected with a public interest" exception.'16 In
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., the Court
held in a 5-4 decision that even the wages paid to employees in a
business affected with a public interest could be regulated, so
long as the regulation was reasonably related to a legitimate pub-
155. Id. at 401-03.
156. Id. at 402.
157. Compare id. at 390, with Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 522, 522 (1923).
158. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402 ('The interference [with the fundamental rights] is plain
enough and no adequate reason therefore in time of peace and domestic tranquility has
been shown.").
159. Bernstein, supra note 119, at 49; see Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-
70 (1931) (holding that the right of free political discussion is a fundamental part of the
constitutional system, and this right encompasses displaying a red flag in a public place as
a symbol of opposition to organized government); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284,
298-99 (1927) (upholding an injunction against a statute imposing special restrictions on
foreign language schools); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667-70 (1925) (holding that
the First Amendment's freedom of expression is a fundamental right included in the Four-
teenth Amendment, but finding the statute in question constitutional); Pierce v. Soc'y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (overturning a law prohibiting private nonreligious
schools).
160. See, e.g., Farrington, 273 U.S. at 298-99; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
161. See, e.g., Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 439 (1930).
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lic interest.162 In Nebbia v. New York, the category of businesses
"affected with a public interest" was expanded to include all busi-
nesses, in all of their aspects, subject only to the requirements of
reasonable relation to a legitimate purpose.163 In an opinion au-
thored by Justice Owen Roberts, the Court stated:
It is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses af-
fected with a public interest, and the function of courts in the appli-
cation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is to determine in
each case whether circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation
as a reasonable exertion of governmental authority or condemn it as
arbitrary or discriminatory. The phrase "affected with a public inter-
est" can, in the nature of things, mean no more than that an indus-
try, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good. In
several of the decisions of this court wherein the expressions "af-
fected with a public interest," and "clothed with a public use," have
been brought forward as the criteria of the validity of price control, it
has been admitted that they are not susceptible of definition and
form an unsatisfactory test of the constitutionality of legislation di-
rected at business practices or prices. These decisions must rest, fi-
nally, upon the basis that the requirements of due process were not
met because the laws were found arbitrary in their operation and ef-
fect. But there can be no doubt that upon proper occasion and by ap-
propriate measures the state may regulate a business in any of its
aspects, including the prices to be charged for the products or com-
modities it sells.16 4
By announcing that any business could be "affected with a public
interest," the Court effectively retired the category, and with it,
much of the special status that liberty of contract had enjoyed.16 5
Finally, in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, the Court abolished the
special status for liberty of contract altogether.'6 6 In upholding a
state law establishing minimum wages for women, the Court
stated:
162. 282 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1931). Several commentators have traced the beginning of
today's rational basis test to Justice Brandeis's majority opinion in O'Gorman. See Barnett
supra note 5, at 1481-82.
163. 291 U.S. 502, 536-37 (1934).
164. Id. (citing Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 535
(1923)).
165. See Cushman, supra note 121, at 80. Liberty of contract would have one more
moment in the sun, in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 610-13 (1936).
In that case, the Court struck down a New York minimum wage law for women and mi-
nors. Id.
166. 300 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1937).
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The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of
liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of
law. In prohibiting that deprivation the Constitution does not recog-
nize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its
phases has its history and connotation. But the liberty safeguarded
is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law
against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals and wel-
fare of the people. Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily
subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is rea-
sonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the
community is due process. This essential limitation of liberty in gen-
eral governs freedom of contract in particular.16 1
Although liberty of contract's special status had been for all in-
tents and purposes killed by Nebbia in 1934,168 and formally bu-
ried by Parrish in 1937,169 the idea that some rights were entitled
to special status lived on. The incorporation doctrine began in
1925 in Gitlow v. New York170 and continued in 1931 when the
Court held that both the First Amendment's free speech and free
press guarantees were a part of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. 7 ' These decisions paved the way for the en-
forcement of much of the Bill of Rights against the states through
due process.17' Along with these decisions, the Court also en-
grafted their tests.
For the development of general substantive due process and
unenumerated rights, however, the incorporation case that would
become most significant was one in which the Court actually re-
fused incorporation. In Palko v. Connecticut, the Court refused to
incorporate the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy provision. 7 1
However, the Court did articulate a standard for what rights
would be encompassed within due process: those "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" and "'so rooted in the traditions and
167. Id.
168. See 291 U.S. at 536-37.
169. See 300 U.S. at 391-92.
170. 268 U.S. 652, 667-70 (1925).
171. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931) (incorporating freedom of press);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931) (incorporating free speech provision).
172. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (incorporating Fourth Amend-
ment search and seizure rules); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1947) (incorpo-
rating First Amendment Establishment Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
305 (1940) (incorporating First Amendment Free Exercise Clause); DeJonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353, 365-66 (1937) (right of peaceable assembly); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
71 (1932) (requiring counsel for indigent defendants in capital cases).
173. 302 U.S. 319, 322 (1937).
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conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.""7 Al-
though Palko was meant to be a limitation on due process claims,
it also reinforced the idea that fundamental rights fell within the
purview of the Fourteenth Amendment.175 This idea, combined
with a case decided five months later, would set the stage for the
modern interpretation of substantive due process.
E. The Modern View of Substantive Due Process
In United States v. Carolene Products Co., the Court reiterated
that most laws infringing on liberty would be analyzed under
what would become known as the rational basis test, stating that,
under that test
the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the
light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some ra-
tional basis within the knowledge and experience of the legisla-
tors.176
However, in its famous Footnote Four, the Court stated that
"[t]here may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of
the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth."'7 The Court
also suggested that a more searching inquiry might need to be
conducted where the legislation at issue "restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal
of undesirable legislation," and is directed at particular religious,
national, or racial minorities, or prejudices "discrete and insular
minorities."178 Just as importantly, Footnote Four repurposed the
Court's prior civil liberties cases to fit this new configuration.11
Thus, Pierce became a case about religious minorities, and Meyer
174. Id. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). In 1969, the
Court decided that the double jeopardy provision did fit under this definition, overruling
Palko. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
175. Palko, 302 U.S. at 322, 324-25.
176. 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
177. Id. at 152 n.4.
178. Id. at 152 n.4.
179. Bernstein, supra note 119, at 52-53.
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a case about national minorities, a result which no doubt sur-
prised their author, Justice McReynolds.'
The implications of what the Court said in Palko and Carolene
Products, along with what the Court implied, were significant for
substantive due process jurisprudence. On the one hand, most
legislation was to be judged by the minimally restrictive rational
basis standard, which presumed the constitutionality of the legis-
lation and the existence of facts to support it."" However, the test
was not a rubber stamp, because the Court also said the following
in Carolene Products:
We may assume for present purposes that no pronouncement of a
legislature can forestall attack upon the constitutionality of the pro-
hibition which it enacts by applying opprobrious epithets to the pro-
hibited act, and that a statute would deny due process which prec-
luded the disproof in judicial proceedings of all facts which would
show or tend to show that a statute depriving the suitor of life, liber-
ty or property had a rational basis.'8 2
Further, Carolene Products said that there might be a more
searching review for legislation implicating those rights in the
Bill of Rights.8 3 This had the obvious effect of protecting the
rights that had been incorporated at the time, along with their
right-specific tests. 84 However, the Court has always said that
these rights were incorporated, not because they were contained
in the Bill of Rights, but rather because they were "fundamen-
tal."18 This raised the question of whether there were other, un-
enumerated, fundamental rights that might also be judged by a
stricter standard, and further, just what that standard might be.
For substantive unenumerated rights cases, as opposed to in-
corporation cases, the answer would not come until 1973.16 After
Carolene Products, but prior to 1973, the Court avoided finding
new unenumerated rights by recasting the few rights it was will-
180. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 (citations omitted). Justice McReynolds
dissented without opinion in Carolene Products. Id. at 155.
181. Id. at 152.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 152 n.4.
184. See id. at 152-53 & n.4.
185. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (collecting Supreme Court
decisions that incorporate Bill of Rights provisions on the basis of a "fundamental right").
186. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judi-
cial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1267, 1283 (2007) (identifying Roe v. Wade as the first ap-
plication of the strict scrutiny test to substantive due process).
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ing to recognize as extensions of enumerated rights, or in one
famous case, Griswold v. Connecticut, as residing within "penum-
bras" created by "emanations" of those rights."
When the Court finally decided to recognize a new unenume-
rated right, the Court grafted onto substantive due process juri-
sprudence the same test it had developed in First Amendment
cases dealing with freedom of speech, freedom of association, and
free exercise of religion, as well as Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection cases dealing with classifications based on race or clas-
sifications infringing on fundamental rights. 88 What has come to
be known as the strict scrutiny test has its beginnings in state-
ments made by the Court in the 1942 case, Skinner v. Oklaho-
ma.89 In determining that a statute providing for the mandatory
sterilization of some three-time felons violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, the Court stated that because procreation was "one
of the basic civil rights of man . . . strict scrutiny of the classifica-
tion which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential."o90
However, the Court in Skinner did not elaborate on what such
scrutiny might entail."'
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Court was more certain.
In the area of free speech, the Court began to require that go-
vernmental entities show a compelling interest in order to justify
infringing on speech. 92 Similarly, in First Amendment free asso-
ciation cases, the Court began requiring a compelling interest,
and requiring a substantial relationship between such interest
187. 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965); Peter Preiser, Rediscovering a Coherent Rationale for
Substantive Due Process, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 44-45 (2003).
188. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (classi-
fication based on race); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (classifications in-
fringing on fundamental rights); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963) (free ex-
ercise of religion); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 525 (1960) (freedom of
association); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958) (freedom of speech); see also Fal-
lon, supra note 186, at 1274-83 (detailing the development of strict scrutiny in these areas
of law).
189. 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see Fallon, supra note 186, at 1281-82 (identifying Skinner as
the first time that the Court used a term akin to strict scrutiny).
190. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
191. See Fallon, supra note 186, at 1282 (noting Skinner's omission).
192. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (stating that "only a compelling
state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regu-
late can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms"); Speiser, 357 U.S. at 529 (noting that
the State had "no such compelling interest at stake" to justify infringing on protected
speech).
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and the statute involved.193 By this time, the compelling interest
requirement had also become the measure for laws substantially
infringing the free exercise of religion, along with a requirement
that "no alternative forms of regulation" existed to combat the
evil.19
During this time period, the Court was not only applying the
compelling interest test to First Amendment claims incorporated
under due process, it was also applying it in cases under the
Equal Protection Clause. 95 The Court held that race-based classi-
fications were "'constitutionally suspect' and subject to 'the most
rigid scrutiny."'6 In 1969 the Court held that all classifications
involving "fundamental" rights would be judged by a strict scru-
tiny test that required the government to show that the regula-
tion was necessary to promote a compelling interest. 7
In Roe v. Wade, the Court imported strict scrutiny into due
process.98 The Court held that, to overcome the right to privacy in
abortion decisions, the governmental entity would have to dem-
onstrate a "compelling state interest" and that the legislation was
"narrowly drawn to express" only that interest.99
At the same time the Court was developing its new version of
fundamental rights jurisprudence, however, it began to take the
rational basis test further and further away from having any re-
levance as a constitutional test. Where the Court had previously
engaged in a substantive review of ends and means, it now began
to distance itself from any such responsibility.20 0 In Lincoln Fed-
eral Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., the Court
stated that it
193. Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); Bates,
361 U.S. at 524-25.
194. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963).
195. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (due process); Skinner,
316 U.S. at 541 (Equal Protection Clause); see Fallon, supra note 186, at 1277-78, 1282-83
(tracing both race and fundamental rights-based equal protection analysis).
196. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192 (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954));
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
197. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
198. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Fallon, supra note 186, at 1283.
199. 410 U.S. at 155 (citations omitted).
200. See EDWARD KEYNES, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND PRIVACY: TOWARD A JURISPRU-
DENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 143-46 (1996).
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has consciously returned closer and closer to the earlier constitu-
tional principle that states have power to legislate against what are
found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and
business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specif-
ic federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid federal law."20 1
Similarly, in 1952's Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, the
Court made it clear that "we do not sit as a super-legislature to
weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy
which it expresses offends the public welfare."202
In 1955, the Court decided Williamson v. Lee Optical,20 a case
that pushed rational basis to the brink of insignificance. 201 The
law at issue in Williamson forbade opticians from fitting or dupli-
cating lenses without a prescription from an ophthalmologist or
optometrist.201 In holding the law to be constitutional, the Court
held that the proper question was not whether the law had a rea-
sonable relation to a legitimate interest, but rather whether the
lawmakers could have reasonably thought that it did.206 The
Court stated that "it is enough that there is an evil at hand for
correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legis-
lative measure was a rational way to correct it."207 The Court also
made it clear that it was abdicating almost all responsibility for
review of nonfundamental rights, stating:
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, im-
provident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought. . . .
For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort
to the polls, not to the courts. 208
As if Williamson were not enough, the Court has proceeded,
through a series of decisions following it, to further "refine" the
rational basis test out of existence. The Court has stated
"Where . .. there are plausible reasons for [the government's] ac-
tion . . . [i]t is . . . 'constitutionally irrelevant whether this reason-
201. 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949).
202. 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
203. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
204. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 1485 (stating that Williamson made the presumption
of constitutionality "for all practical purposes, irrebuttable").
205. 348 U.S. at 485 & n.1.
206. Id. at 487-88.
207. Id. at 488.
208. Id. (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)).
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ing in fact underlay the legislative decision. . . ."'209 Further, "a
legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may
be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or em-
pirical data."210 Apparently, it also no longer even matters under
the rational basis test whether the facts supporting the legisla-
tion are true.2 1  To overcome the presumption of constitutionality,
the challenger must show that no rational legislator could have
thought that the law was reasonably related to its purpose. 212
The strict scrutiny strand and the rational basis test strand
unite to form the predominant test today. Articulated in its most
complete form in Washington v. Glucksberg,213 and reaffirmed last
year in District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v.
Osborne,214 the test requires "a 'careful description"' of the pur-
ported right or liberty interest.2 15 The Court then looks to see
whether the purported right or liberty interest is fundamental,
employing a test looking at whether the interest is "deeply
rooted" in the history and traditions of the nation.116 If the right is
deeply rooted, and thus fundamental, it is subject to strict scruti-
ny and cannot be infringed unless the regulation at issue is both
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and narrow-
ly tailored to further that interest.2 17 As a practical matter, the
finding that an interest is fundamental is fatal to the infringing
law. 218 If, however, the interest is not fundamental, then the in-
fringing law need only be reasonably or rationally related to a le-
gitimate state interest to pass constitutional muster.2 19
The evolution of substantive due process from its English ante-
cedents to the Glucksberg test reveals two very important facts
209. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (quoting Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960)). Fritz was technically what might be thought of as an equal pro-
tection case under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 173 n.8.
210. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
211. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991). In Gregory, the Court held in an
Equal Protection Clause case that a mandatory retirement age for judges had a rational
basis even though, "it is far from true that all judges suffer significant deterioration in
performance at age 70. It is probably not true that most do. It may not be true at all." Id.
212. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979).
213. 521 U.S. 702, 719-23 (1997).
214. 557 U.S. -, _ , 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2319-23 (2009).
215. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
216. Id. at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
217. Id. at 721 (citing Flores, 507 U.S. at 302).
218. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
219. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722, 728.
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related to the enforcement of unenumerated rights. First, the
concept of substantive due process has always been an evolving
one, with different formulations of the doctrine shifting in re-
sponse not only to different facts, but also to different ideas re-
garding such things as the proper allocation of government power
and the proper evidence that courts might consider in determin-
ing whether the government has overstepped those bounds. The
other side of this realization is that there really is no "golden age"
of substantive due process where the doctrine was pure. Nonethe-
less, there has always been a clear understanding that unenume-
rated rights exist, and that substantive due process serves to pro-
tect them.
IV. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE SYSTEM
Unfortunately, the system described in Glucksberg has run into
problems. This should be no surprise given the polarization that
both the strict scrutiny test and the rational basis test have un-
dergone. The strict scrutiny test is so strict that almost all legis-
lation fails to meet it.220 Although it may not actually live up to its
reputation as "strict in theory, fatal in fact," it is the rare case in-
deed where legislation lives up to its requirements.221 Because of
this, the Court has retreated into what one commentator has re-
ferred to as a "rights-identifying shell," where it is hesitant to
identify new rights.2 22 On the other hand, the only alternative al-
lowed by the formula is the rational basis test, which is tanta-
mount to no test at all. 223
The distance between the two prongs has caused problems in
hard cases, where the interests are important. In such hard cas-
es, the Court has chosen to ignore Glucksberg entirely, in favor of
other tests. 224 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylva-
nia v. Casey, the Court employed a test based on what the joint
opinion by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter characterized
220. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 796 (2006).
221. Id. at 796-97.
222. Niles, supra note 2, at 138.
223. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 1485 (characterizing the test as "[n]o matter what
the person whose liberty is restricted has to say, the government wins").
224. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV.
63, 64-68 (2006) (noting the different theories employed by recent Supreme Court deci-
sions involving substantive due process).
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as "reasoned judgment," based on "'the balance which our Nation,
built upon the postulates of respect for the liberty of the individu-
al, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized
society."'225 In looking at the liberty interest of a woman in choos-
ing an abortion, the Court eschewed the usual fundamental right
calculation and level of scrutiny analysis in favor of a more ab-
stract balancing test.226 The Court began with the idea that "[alt
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of exis-
tence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life."'2 From this, the Court found a "constitutional liberty of the
woman to have some freedom to terminate her pregnancy," which
it then balanced against "the interest of the State in the protec-
tion of potential life" to conclude that the line for the right should
be drawn at viability, and that states could regulate the right so
long as they did not impose an undue burden on its exercise. 28
The Court in Casey made no mention of fundamental rights,
strict scrutiny, or rational basis. Rather, as Professor Daniel 0.
Conkle has noted, the Court seemed to "announce[ ] a presump-
tive right of personal autonomy and self-definition."2 29 The differ-
ence between this approach and the approach in Glucksberg is
evident. Where the test from Glucksberg demands a narrow defi-
nition of the asserted interest and then requires proof of histori-
cal relevance, 2 0 the Casey approach begins with a presumption of
liberty within the wide sphere of personal autonomy and balances
the governmental interest against it from there.2 3' Further, rather
than the almost "all-or-nothing" approach of fundamental versus
nonfundamental rights employed in Glucksberg,"11 the Casey ap-
proach seeks to find a balance between the competing interests. 233
Abortion is not the only area in which the Court has abandoned
the Glucksberg framework. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court did
not expressly articulate whether the liberty interest of persons to
225. 505 U.S. 833, 837, 849-50 (1992) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)); see also Conkle, supra note 224, at 103-04 (referring to the ap-
proach in Casey as the "reasoned judgment" theory of substantive due process).
226. See generally Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
227. Id. at 851.
228. Id. at 869, 871, 874.
229. Conkle, supra note 224, at 104.
230. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
231. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857.
232. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721; id. at 770 (Souter, J., concurring).
233. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849-50.
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engage in private homosexual conduct was "fundamental," or
whether the scrutiny required was strict scrutiny or some other
level. 234 Rather, the Court simply held that the interest was part
of the personal liberty inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment,
and could not be criminalized by the state.235 Rather than talk of
"rights," such as the right to privacy, the Lawrence opinion talks
of "liberty" as a more amorphous concept.2 3 6
Even in situations involving enumerated rights where the Due
Process Clause is not involved, the Court's recent jurisprudence
has problems with its tiered scrutiny framework. In 2008's Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Heller, the Court determined that there is a
private right to "keep and bear arms" under the Second Amend-
ment. 237 However, in discussing that interest in relation to the
District of Columbia's firearms law, the Court refused to specify
what level of scrutiny it was employing, stating instead that the
law banning handguns from the home was unconstitutional
"[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to
enumerated constitutional rights."238 In response to Justice Brey-
er's dissenting opinion questioning this statement and stating
that the law would almost certainly pass rational basis review,
the majority opinion conceded the point but stated that "rational-
basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used when evaluat-
ing laws under constitutional commands that are themselves
prohibitions on irrational laws."239 According to the majority, "[i]n
those cases, 'rational basis' is not just the standard of scrutiny,
but the very substance of the constitutional guarantee."240
The decision of the Court in Heller does little to clear up the
confusion regarding the proper test for constitutional rights. It af-
firms that the rational basis test is not applicable to enumerated
rights, but intimates that there may be other tests that might ap-
ply. Moreover, as Justice Breyer notes in his dissent, the opinion
approves a set of gun restrictions, including restrictions on con-
cealed weapons, prohibitions of firearms in certain locales, and
234. 539 U.S. 558, 594 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 578 (majority opinion).
236. Id. at 578-79.
237. 554 U.S. -, ,128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008).
238. Id. at , 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
239. Id. at _, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.27.
240. Id.
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regulation of commercial firearm sales, "whose constitutionality
under a strict scrutiny standard would be far from clear."241
Nor is Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion any more clarifying
than the majority's opinion. He argues that the "adoption of a
true strict scrutiny standard for evaluating gun regulations
would be impossible" because nearly all gun regulations further a
compelling state interest, the "concern for the safety and . .. lives
of [the state's] citizens."2 42 Thus, he contends, any case will turn
on an interest-balancing test of whether the "regulation at issue
impermissibly burdens the [interests protected by the Second
Amendment] in the course of advancing [governmental safety
concerns] ."243 However, it is difficult to see why Breyer thinks this
fact should invalidate the strict scrutiny test, as what he is de-
scribing is actually the strict scrutiny test.2 44 That is, a court first
looks to see whether the state interest is compelling, and if so,
whether the regulation is "narrowly tailored" to advance that in-
terest, which is simply another way of saying that the rule does
not impermissibly burden the exercise of the right.
What has emerged, then, is an unworkable system. In this sys-
tem, the Court professes to have a standard framework for subs-
tantive due process, the Glucksberg test, with a carefully regi-
mented procedure for defining rights and then assessing their
importance, which then translates into a formula for judging the
validity of the law in question.2 45 The problem comes in cases
where this framework produces a result that is incompatible with
what the majority of the Justices think the right answer should
be. In these "hard" cases, the right involved is not sufficiently ac-
cepted as important enough to be classified as fundamental.
However, the only alternative is the rational basis test,246 which,
as noted above, is almost toothless. In such circumstances, the
Court abandons the framework altogether. Thus, instead of the
framework determining the answer, the answer itself determines
the framework in many cases.
241. Id. at-, 128S. Ct. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
242. Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)).
243. Id. at _, 128 S. Ct. at 2852.
244. See id. at _, 128 S. Ct. at 2851 (A '"strict scrutiny' test would . .. require review-
ing with care each gun law to determine whether it is 'narrowly tailored to achieve a com-
pelling governmental interest,"' (quoting Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997))).
245. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
246. See supra notes 204-12 and accompanying text.
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This may not be an insurmountable problem for the Supreme
Court of the United States, in that it sees very few substantive
due process cases. It is a much greater problem, however, for low-
er federal and state courts, who see the majority of litigation on
this subject. Those courts are required to apply the Supreme
Court's framework, and are not free to invent their way around
hard cases involving rights. For these courts, the extreme defe-
rence created by the rational basis test, combined with the ex-
treme strictness of the strict scrutiny test, almost guarantees that
their decision will be skewed against the claimant. As a result,
the Ninth Amendment's promise that the "rights retained" by the
people shall not be "disparaged" is broken.47
V. PUTTING RATIONALITY BACK INTO THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST
What then, is to be done to redeem the promise of the Ninth
Amendment with regard to unenumerated rights? Legal scholars
have no shortage of answers in this regard. A number of scholars
favor dispensing with the tiered scrutiny system altogether, in
favor of systems that they claim do a better job of properly ba-
lancing the power of the government and the rights of people.248
Under Randy Barnett's "presumption of liberty" framework, for
example, any interference with what he terms "rightful conduct"
must be justified by a governmental showing that it is both ne-
cessary and proper. 24 9 Under Mark Niles's "Ninth Amendment ad-
judicatory mechanism," any governmental intrusion affecting pri-
vate activity must be justified by a showing that "the public
impact of the act is substantial enough, and the public interest
[is] compelling enough, to justify the [intrusion]." 250
These tests and others like them that scholars have developed
are often quite well-developed and eloquent. Were the task to de-
247. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 1496 (arguing that the Glucksberg formulation as
currently used violates the Ninth Amendment).
248. See, e.g., id. at 1496-1500 (arguing that his "presumption of liberty" framework
fits better with the proper interpretation of unenumerated rights than the Glucksberg
framework); Niles, supra note 2, at 123-43 (advocating replacing substantive due process
with a "Ninth Amendment adjudication mechanism" that would examine "whether gov-
ernment action that places a significant burden on the expression of personal autonomy or
freedom is motivated by an unconstitutional interest in controlling private action or pri-
vate choices").
249. BARNETT, supra note 39, at 259-66.
250. Niles, supra note 2, at 132-33. Niles describes this test as similar to the fit test of
intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 133.
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sign a mechanism to protect unenumerated rights out of a blank
slate, each would have undeniable appeal. The problem, however,
is that the jurisprudence on unenumerated rights is hardly a
blank slate. Trying to overhaul the entire system of tiered scruti-
ny in favor of an entirely new system would require a doctrinal
shift of a magnitude even greater than that of 1937. To date
courts show no signs of moving in this direction. Although Bar-
nett characterized the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v.
Texas as a move towards his presumption of liberty framework, 25 1
this move was apparently shortlived, as the majority of the lower
courts continue to use the Glucksberg framework.252
This is not to say that proponents of these comprehensive re-
forms are misguided in their theory, as the history of substantive
due process demonstrates that theories can become doctrine un-
der the right conditions."53 However, the chances of a complete
overhaul of substantive due process jurisprudence in the near fu-
ture exceedingly small. Thus, the authors of these types of theo-
ries should not be too surprised that they remain theoretical.
The same can be said for those proponents who would jettison
substantive due process in favor of privileges or immunities or
both under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 54 At first
glance, this would seem more likely to happen than a total re-
working of unenumerated rights, in that the only precedent that
would have to be overturned is the unpopular Slaughter-House
Cases.255 For a brief time, legal scholars believed that the Court's
1999 opinion in Saenz v. Roe, wherein the Court invoked the right
to travel as a component of privileges or immunities to invalidate
a California statute restricting Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families payments for newcomers to the state,'256 heralded a re-
birth of the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities
Clause.257 Once again, that optimism appears to have been prema-
251. Barnett, supra note 5, at 1495.
252. See Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process
Since Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MIcH. L. REV. 409, 424-31 (2006) (surveying lower court
substantive due process cases after Lawrence and concluding that the Glucksberg frame-
work was overwhelmingly used while Lawrence was barely mentioned).
253. See supra notes 117-75 and accompanying text (detailing the rise and fall of liber-
ty of contract).
254. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 8, at 28-30.
255. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
256. 526 U.S. 489, 495, 497-98, 503 (1999).
257. See Kyle Alexander Casazza, Note, Inkblots: How the Ninth Amendment and the
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ture, as the Privileges or Immunities Clause has not been relied
upon again in the ten-plus years since Saenz.25 8 Further, a recent
attempt to revive the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the ve-
hicle for incorporating the Second Amendment received a chilly
reception by the Court.259
This lack of practicality is also a problem for those advocating
the abandonment of tiered scrutiny in favor of a return to some
Lochnerian golden age of due process wherein the "government
always bear[s] the burden" to demonstrate a "substantial rela-
tion" between a restriction on liberty and the government's need
for health, safety, and economic welfare.260 If the history of subs-
tantive due process demonstrates one thing, it is that there is no
golden age where the doctrine of substantive due process was per-
fect. 26 1 Rather, substantive due process and unenumerated rights
in general have always been evolving, from their birth in England
to the present.2 62 The present system of tiered scrutiny is simply a
product of that evolution.
More importantly for our purposes, there seems to be little ap-
petite among modern courts for such a return. The closest the
Supreme Court has come to traveling the road to this sort of ba-
lancing was Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Glucksberg.263
Privileges or Immunities Clause Protect Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 80 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1383, 1402-03 (2007) (discussing the optimism surrounding the Clause in the wake
of Saenz). But see Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Revival Portend the Future-Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 110, 110 (1999) (discussing this optimism but stating that such a revival was "unlike-
ly").
258. James Fox, Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship and the Reconstruction-Era Black
Public Sphere, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1245, 1246-47 (2009) (discussing the legal irrelevance of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause because it is rarely utilized in courts "[w]ith the sin-
gle exception of . .. Saenz").
259. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-7, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. ,
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-argu
ments/argumenttranscripts/08-1521.pdf. Addressing petitioners' argument that the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause should be used to incorporate the Second Amendment, Justice
Scalia inquired "why are you asking us to overrule 150, 140 years of prior law, when-
when you can reach your result under substantive due (process]-I mean, you know, un-
less you're bucking for a-a place on some law school faculty." Id. at 6:25-7:3.
260. See, e.g., Preiser, supra note 187, at 48-53 (favoring a return to what Preiser cha-
racterizes as the "standard developed at the birth of substantive due process").
261. See discussion Part III supra (describing the development of substantive due pro-
cess throughout English and American history).
262. See discussion Part III supra.
263. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752-89 (1997) (Souter, J., concur-
ring).
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In that concurring opinion, Justice Souter set forth a theory of
due process in which the court would weigh and balance the com-
peting liberty interest and governmental interest in order to de-
termine whether the law in question is reasonable.264 However,
his invitation to jettison tiered scrutiny in favor of complex ba-
lancing was explicitly rejected by the majority. 265 With Justice
Souter's departure from the Court, there appears no one ready to
take up such a move.
This leaves supporters of substantive due process jurispru-
dence in a quandary. It seems irrefutable that the Glucksberg
tiered scrutiny approach, as currently set in law, is broken. As
currently set out, the rigor of the strict scrutiny test makes the
Court reluctant to recognize new fundamental rights, but the im-
potence of the rational basis test leaves all other rights essential-
ly unprotected. On the other hand, there is little appetite for ab-
andoning that approach in favor of a different system altogether.
What is needed, then, is a way to preserve the Court's current
substantive due process jurisprudence to a great extent, while at
the same time provide a way to protect important rights that
courts are reluctant to deem fundamental. The best way to do this
is to bring some meaning back into the rationality review by
strengthening the rational basis test.
A. Why Strengthen Rational Basis as Opposed to Other
Solutions?
The assertion that the salvation of substantive due process ju-
risprudence lies in the strengthening of the rational basis test
raises an important question: Why is it more desirable to streng-
then the rational basis test than to establish a level of "interme-
diate scrutiny" review, such as the one that already exists under
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?
To answer that question, it is useful to remember what the
Equal Protection Clause's levels of tiered scrutiny are designed to
do. Although due process tiered scrutiny and equal protection
tiered scrutiny share many of the same terms, they are not syn-
onymous. Tiered scrutiny under due process is based on the im-
portance of the right in question, while Tiered scrutiny under
264. Id. at 766-69.
265. Id. at 721-22.
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equal protection is based primarily on motive. 26 6 Strict scrutiny is
required for "suspect classes" under equal protection because of
the prospect of invidious discrimination against these classes. 267
Intermediate scrutiny is required for those classes that are la-
beled "quasi-suspect" because of the likelihood of discriminatory
motivation or effect. 268 Due process tiered scrutiny, on the other
hand, is based on the importance of the right at issue, with the
level of scrutiny dependent on whether the right is fundamental
or not.
Further, establishing a middle tier for due process would simp-
ly move the problem down a level. On the one hand, courts might
be more likely to classify rights in that middle level, as the test
involved would not be as "fatal in fact" to the law as in the strict
scrutiny analysis.26 9 Nevertheless, there would still be reluctance
on the part of the courts to highlight such rights by according
them special status.
Finally, intermediate scrutiny has been heavily criticized be-
cause of its indeterminate language.270 Unlike strict scrutiny or
the rational basis test, intermediate scrutiny is more overtly a
"balancing mode" that invites judges to weigh a multitude of fac-
tors.21 Although this is not in and of itself a fatal flaw, it does
tend to make decisions under intermediate scrutiny subject to
charges of judicial activism. Taken together, all of these factors
make intermediate scrutiny a hard sell in the due process frame-
work.
266. See generally 2 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU & WIILIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAw §§ 25.02-25.04 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing tiered scrutiny in the equal protec-
tion context).
267. See id. § 25.02. The equal protection framework is to some extent concerned with
the nature of rights, in that it also applies heightened judicial scrutiny to those laws that
affect fundamental interests such as those that affect the electoral process, the right to
travel, and access to the courts. However, this heightened scrutiny does not fit well within
the three-tiered framework. See id. § 25.04 (discussing equal protection analysis of bur-
dens on fundamental interests).
268. See 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOwAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.3(a)(iv) (4th ed. 2008).
269. If the equal protection test were carried across, it would end up being something
like putting the burden on the government to show that the governmental interest is im-
portant and that the law is substantially related to that interest.
270. See George C. Hlavac, Interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause: A Constitu-
tional Shell Game, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1349, 1375 (1993) (criticizing the intermediate
scrutiny test as too "malleable").
271. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Bal-
ancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 293-94 (1992).
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B. Strengthening the Test
The first step in strengthening the rational basis test is to un-
derstand the principles that it seeks to promote. On the one hand,
the rational basis test is rooted in the English common law con-
cept that laws cannot be "arbitrary," but instead must be based
on reason.272 On the other hand, the rational basis test reflects the
determination that the legislature is the primary authority to de-
termine what laws are necessary, and should be given defe-
rence.2 13 Only if laws contravene accepted rights or are not ration-
ally related to a proper legislative purpose can they be stricken by
a court.2 14 This is a recognition not only of legislative prerogative
and the democratic process, but also a recognition of the limits of
judicial competence. In general, courts should keep to the areas in
which they have competence, and leave the wisdom of policy to
the legislatures.
These principles mean that, even though the rational basis test
needs to be strengthened, the presumption of constitutionality
should still apply. As noted previously, the idea that a law
enacted by the legislature should be presumed valid unless shown
to violate the Constitution is longstanding in American legal
theory, and has been a part of the rational basis test since its be-
ginnings in the late eighteen hundreds.2 75
Those scholars who would apply a presumption in favor of li-
berty base their argument on the idea that liberty is the default
state under the American form of government, 276 or on the argu-
ment that the original underpinnings of the presumption of con-
stitutionality are no longer valid. 277 However, neither of these ar-
guments provide justification for abandoning long-held precedent.
The idea that the government must justify every intrusion into
liberty because liberty is the default state of our government ig-
nores the longstanding traditions relating to governmental pow-
er. While it is true that the federal government is one of limited
272. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
273. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
274. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); see also Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
275. See Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 392-93 (1895); Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661.
276. See Preiser, supra note 187, at 51.
277. See BARNE'T'T, supra note 39, at 260.
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powers, from the beginning of the Republic, it has been allowed to
use those powers in a wide variety of manners, so long as the use
was neither arbitrary nor transgressed identified rights.2 "* This is
even more true when the enactments of state legislatures are
concerned. The power of state legislatures is to enact legislation
for health, safety, and welfare, even where it may to some extent
curtail the ability of its citizens to do as they please. 27 9 This power
is curtailed only when its use transgresses constitutional rights
or is arbitrary.28 0
Randy Barnett has argued that the presumption of constitutio-
nality is no longer valid because its assumption that legislatures,
whether state or federal, would carefully consider the constitu-
tional protections of liberty before enacting legislation that would
infringe upon it, has been shown to be false. 281 He contends that
because this proposition was shown to be erroneous, the pre-
sumption of constitutionality must also fail. 28 2
I will be the first to admit that this argument has some unde-
niable appeal. However, it shortchanges the original justification
of the presumption of constitutionality and ignores political reali-
ties. The original justification of the presumption was not only
that legislatures would consider the constitutionality of the
enactment, which today to us sounds naive, but also that defe-
rence to the legislature's decisions would promote republican
principles, and that the legislatures possessed an institutional
superiority over courts in deciding factual issues such as the ne-
cessity for legislation.283 Neither of these arguments are depen-
dent upon the legislature actually considering the constitutionali-
ty of the legislation it enacts.
More importantly, the political realities argue in favor of keep-
ing the presumption. In today's world, where charges of "judicial
activism" come from both sides of the political spectrum, it is in
the best interests of courts to incorporate some deference to the
278. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 323-25 (1819) (providing
an expansive view of the Necessary and Proper Clause).
279. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
280. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575, 580 (1991) (explaining the
concept of state police powers).
281. BARNETT, supra note 39, at 260.
282. Id.
283. See F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447, 1469-72 (2010).
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legislature in their decisions. It is difficult to conceive that the
abandonment of the rationale would do anything but hurt the le-
gitimacy of the courts.
It is important to carefully note the burden that the presump-
tion of constitutionality places on the challenger of a statute. The
presumption of constitutionality is not a rule of evidence that re-
quires the presumption of certain facts when others have been
proven, but rather simply a method of allocating the burden of
persuasion.284 It simply places the burden on the challenger of the
regulation to bring before the court evidence from which the court
can base its conclusion that the legislation is unconstitutional.
2 85
The allocation of the burden is not the main problem with the
way the rational basis test operates today. Rather, the problem is
the nature of the burden allocated. The standard, as articulated
in cases such as Williamson v. Lee Optical and FCC Communica-
tions v. Beach, which requires that the challenger produce evi-
dence to negate every possible basis for the legislation, whether
or not the basis was the actual reason for the legislation, or
whether or not the basis is supported by any evidence, is the true
problem with the rational basis test.28 6 Properly applied, without
resort to a judicial dodge, the Williamson and Beach standard is
so toothless as to constitute no meaningful review at all; instead
it essentially makes the presumption of constitutionality "irrebut-
table."287
There is no institutional reason for this level of deference. The
heart of the rational basis standard is that the court should not
interfere if the purpose of the legislation is reasonably related to
some valid governmental purpose. This standard, however,
should not be read to prevent courts from inquiring into the go-
vernmental purpose of the legislation, or determining the fit of
the solution to the purpose. It is true that courts have "never re-
quire[d] a legislature to articulate the reasons for enacting a sta-
tute."a28 Nevertheless, this does not mean that legislatures never
284. See Michael L. Stokes, Judicial Restraint and the Presumption of Constitutionali-
ty, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 347, 365-66 (2003) (discussing the use of the doctrine by the Su-
preme Court of Ohio).
285. Id.
286. See supra notes 203-12 and accompanying text (describing the test articulated in
Williamson and its progeny).
287. Barnett, supra note 5, at 1485.
288. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
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articulate the reasons for enacting a statute, nor that the court is
incapable of ascertaining the reasons even when they are not ar-
ticulated. Indeed, determining the legislative intent in enacting a
statute from the language used, principles of statutory construc-
tion, and legislative history is one of the things that courts are
generally tasked with when interpreting statutes.2 9 It is true that
this is not an exact science; however, it is certainly not so faulty
as to justify courts in throwing up their hands in defeat.
Nor should courts be required to stand idly when legislation
negatively impacts rights simply because "a legislative choice is
not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data."29 1 While
it is enough for most purposes that the law be reasonably related
to a legitimate purpose, it must still be just that-reasonably re-
lated. It should not be enough that some legislator somewhere
thought the law might be reasonably related to a legitimate pur-
pose.
Instead, the proper test under a strengthened rational basis
standard should be akin to that used by the Supreme Court in
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,291 one of the so-
called "rational basis with bite" cases decided under the Equal
Protection Clause.292 In these cases, the Court professed to apply
the rational basis standard, but none of the different versions of
the standard employed in the cases were the same rational basis
standard that Williamson set out.2 9 3
289. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 213 (2000) (citations omitted). Of course,
not every member of the current Court agrees with this idea. Justice Scalia believes that
legislative history is unreliable and is not a valid means of determining legislative intent.
See ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 29-37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
290. See Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. at 315.
291. 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
292. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-47;
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982). The term "rational basis with bite" that has
now entered the constitutional law lexicon was spawned by a 1972 Harvard Law Review
article by Gerald Gunther. See Gunther, supra note 5. Gunther was referring to six equal
protection cases decided in 1971 and 1972 in which the Supreme Court stated it applied
rational basis review, but seemed to make a more searching inquiry. Id. at 19-21. Gunther
stated that these cases had "bite," unlike the "traditionally toothless minimal scrutiny
standard." Id. at 18-19.
293. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 633-36; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449-50; Plyler, 457 U.S. at
223-24.
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Cleburne is a prime example of the inherent limitations of the
modern rational basis test.294 In Cleburne, the Court faced a Texas
zoning ordinance that excluded group homes for the mentally dis-
abled.295 As the Court noted, the real reason for the legislation
seemed to be "an irrational prejudice against the mentally re-
tarded."29 6 Nevertheless, the government asserted several reasons
for denying the Cleburne Living Center a permit under the zon-
ing ordinance, including attitudes of neighbors, likelihood that
residents of the home might be harassed by area students, and
potential overcrowding of the facility.297
The Court was squarely faced with a dilemma in Cleburne. It
was reluctant to include mental retardation as a new quasi-
suspect class because it would subject all government action
based on that classification to a more probing level of review. 298
However, under the rational basis test as it stood, the discrimina-
tory legislation would almost certainly pass. At least one of the
reasons, the potential overcrowding of the facility, was almost
certainly a legitimate governmental reason for denying the per-
mit. 29 9 It did not matter, under the Williamson standard, that this
might not have been the true reason for the legislation; William-
son made it clear that the dispositive inquiry was not whether the
law had a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest, but rather
whether the lawmakers could have reasonably thought that it
did. 00 Further, it did not matter that the City had not chosen to
deny permits for other group homes in the area before.ox Under
the Williamson standard, "'reform may take one step at a time,
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most
acute to the legislative mind."'302
Faced with this problem, the Court nonetheless purported to
apply rational basis level scrutiny, holding that "legislation that
distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be
294. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449-50.
295. Id. at 435.
296. Id. at 450.
297. Id. at 448-50.
298. Id. at 446.
299. Id. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
300. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
301. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449-50.
302. Id. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Wil-
liamson, 348 U.S. at 489).
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rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose" to with-
stand equal protection review.30 The Court reviewed the purposes
asserted by the government one by one and determined that none
were a rational or constitutional basis for excluding group homes
for the mentally retarded.o The Court dealt with the City's claim
of overcrowding by noting that the zoning code would not have
excluded other group homes, such as fraternities or sororities.o
Despite assertions to the contrary, Cleburne was not a case of
the Court applying intermediate scrutiny as that term is normal-
ly known.30 6 In traditional intermediate scrutiny, the Court re-
quires that the legislation in question bear a substantial relation
to an important governmental purpose.30 The Court in Cleburne
did not require that the purpose be important, or that the relation
be substantial.3o8
In Cleburne, the Court really engaged in a traditional means-
ends test of rationality. It was skeptical of the motives behind the
legislation, but its primary holding was that, even accepting the
proferred reasons behind the arguments as legitimate, the statute
was not rationally related to them.0- For the Court, the means
chosen to achieve the alleged legitimate governmental purpose
were not rational, and reinforced the notion that the true purpose
of the legislation was impermissible discrimination.3 10
Cleburne also demonstrates the shortcoming of the Williamson
version of the rational basis test, which is its inability to probe
the motives of the city's action. 1, There was really no question
that the genesis of the refusal to issue the permit was prejudice
303. Id. at 446 (majority opinion).
304. Id. at 448-50.
305. Id. at 449-50.
306. See Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny
by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 801 (1987) (arguing that the analysis in Cleburne
and other cases was "nothing more than a camouflaged application" of intermediate scru-
tiny). The argument that some of the rational basis with bite cases are indeed applying
intermediate scrutiny is much stronger for cases such as Plyler v. Doe. Id. at 785.
307. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
308. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 437-38, 442-44 (holding that the court of appeals erred in
applying the intermediate scrutiny standard in deciding the case).
309. Id. at 449-50.
310. See id. at 450.
311. Compare Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (expressing skepticism towards the motives
behind the legislation), with Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)
(stating that the legislation in question "need not be in every respect logically consistent
with its aims to be constitutional").
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against the group involved. In making motive irrelevant, the Wil-
liamson standard would have allowed this discrimination so long
as there was another rational basis that would have supported
the decision. The problem with this standard is that there is al-
most always another rational basis for any type of legislative ac-
tion. This problem is particularly acute if the governmental body
promulgating the legislation is not obliged to base its action on
any sort of evidence, or to even be correct about the relation be-
tween the ends and the means.
Cleburne further demonstrates the problems that exist at the
other end of the scrutiny spectrum. The Court's reluctance to con-
sider mental retardation as a suspect or quasi-suspect classifica-
tion was based on the idea that there are often good reasons for
legislative classifications that treat those persons suffering from
mental retardation differently, and often more favorably, than
other persons.312 The Court feared that requiring legislatures to
justify those favorable laws under a heightened scrutiny standard
would cause them to refrain from passing such laws at all.',, The
heightened standard, even at intermediate scrutiny, was too high
a bar.
Had the Court not departed from the Williamson standard in
Cleburne, the plaintiffs would have been left without protection.
While it might be comforting to say, as the Court has said on nu-
merous occasions, that in the absence of protection, plaintiffs
would be able to find a remedy through the democratic process, 3 14
this remedy would have been highly unlikely to occur in the case
of group homes for the developmentally disabled. Although the
majority in Cleburne stated that mentally retarded individuals
were not politically powerless, a determination based mostly on
the fact that many laws offer them specific protections,"' the ma-
jority's decision did not comprehend that the situation might be
different in a situation where the issue involved a group home
zoning decision made by a city government.
The problem with motive and purpose is just as acute in the
substantive due process context as it is in equal protection. In the
312. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-46.
313. Id. at 444-45.
314. See, e.g., id. at 440; Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113, 134 (1877)).
315. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443-45.
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same way that majorities can discriminate against minorities in
singling them out for discriminatory treatment, majorities can al-
so fail to recognize or infringe upon politically unpopular rights.
Under the Williamson version of rational basis, such infringe-
ment can almost always be justified by some purpose.
Under a strengthened rational basis analysis under the Due
Process Clause, however, courts would be empowered, as the Su-
preme Court did in Cleburne, to look at the purposes behind the
governmental action. In doing so, courts would be allowed to use
all of the tools that they normally use in determining legislative
intent, including the language of the statute itself and the cir-
cumstances surrounding its passage. The focus of such an inquiry
would be, not on technically plausible reasons for the action, but
on the actual (or at least probable) reason for the action. Courts
would also, of course, consider any justifications for the statutes
raised by the parties. However, where those justifications consist
of nothing more than ad hoc rationalizations, courts would be al-
lowed to disregard them to reach the true purpose of the regula-
tion.
There is an argument to be made, and in fact has been made
most notably by Justice Scalia, that legislative history should not
be authoritative in the interpretation of a statute.1 6 However,
there is a real difference, I believe, between using legislative his-
tory to try to determine the legislature's intent regarding how a
statute is to be applied to a particular issue, and using the legis-
lative history to demonstrate the purpose the statute was de-
signed to reach. In the former case, the issue involved may be one
of which the majority of legislators, to quote Scalia, were "bliss-
fully unaware of the existence ... much less had any preference
as to how it should be resolved."317 When talking about the main
purpose behind the enactment of the statute itself, however, there
is generally always at least some information from which a statu-
tory purpose, or at least a small number of likely purposes, can be
divined. 18 This is especially true considering that, unlike matters
316. See SCALIA, supra note 289, at 29-30 (arguing that legislative history should not
be used to determine the intent of a statute because of its unreliability).
317. Id. at 32.
318. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
The Holy Trinity case construing the Alien Contract Labor Law of 1885 is one of the cases
most often used to demonstrate the vagaries of legislative history because the legislative
history could be interpreted in so many different ways. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY &
[Vol. 45:491542
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of statutory interpretation, where the statute involved may be
quite old, statutes and other enactments involved in constitution-
al challenges are generally quite recent."
It must be emphasized that the burden is still on the party
challenging the statute to demonstrate that the statute is not ra-
tionally related to a valid legislative purpose, either because the
purpose itself is not within the power of the government, or be-
cause the connection between the statute and the purpose is te-
nuous. The government is still entitled to a presumption of con-
stitutionality, and facts supporting the enactment are presumed,
until rebutted by the challenging party.
Unlike the Williamson test, however, the ultimate determina-
tion of reasonableness turns on whether the enactment actually
does bear a rational relationship to the valid governmental pur-
pose. Where the legislative enactment infringes on an identified
liberty interest, it is not enough that some legislator might have
thought that there was a rational relationship. Liberty demands
an actual rational link between the means and the ends.
C. Benefits of a Strengthened Rational Basis Test
Using a strengthened rational basis test as the bottom tier of
scrutiny in substantive due process review affords several bene-
fits to the system. From a practical standpoint, the continuation
of the current tiered scrutiny system does not disrupt the current
legal landscape. One of the primary benefits cited for using tiered
scrutiny is that it "avoids the need for complex balancing of com-
peting interests in every case." 0 Under the proposed system with
strengthened rational basis, this benefit continues. Although a
reviewing court will have a greater responsibility to inquire as to
whether there really is a rational basis of the legislation, this is a
GARRETT, supra note 289, at 217; Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity:
Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (2000);
Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold
Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998). However, while the legislative
history of the statute in that case may not have solved the question of whether the Act was
to apply to ministers, there was no real question that the overall purpose of the Act was to
keep out foreign labor.
319. There are, of course, exceptions. The statute at issue in Lawrence was passed in
1974. However, it was not constitutionally challenged because, up until Lawrence, it had
never been enforced. See Jackson, supra note 34, at 217.
320. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S 702, 722 (1997).
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lesser, and more precise, inquiry than one requiring the court to
balance competing interests on a case-by-case basis. The primary
beneficiaries of the retention of tiered scrutiny will be the lower
courts, who will be able to rely on a familiar landscape to frame
their decisions.
The use of a strengthened rational basis also retains the pro-
tection for truly fundamental rights inherent in the current tiered
scrutiny system. Those rights that have been afforded strict scru-
tiny protection in the past will continue to receive it. As a result,
the risk that a sea change in the Court's substantive due process
jurisprudence will upset long-held rights is greatly reduced. Simi-
larly, the pressure to refrain from creating new fundamental
rights for fear of putting them beyond the reach of the democratic
process with too much protection, or the pressure to create new
fundamental rights lest important liberty interests be left entire-
ly unprotected is diminished as well. Courts can continue to act
carefully in those areas where "'guideposts for responsible deci-
sionmaking ... are scarce and open-ended,"'321 while at the same
time allowing a level of protection for liberty.
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the use of a streng-
thened rational basis standard will help to restore a level of ho-
nesty to the substantive due process doctrine. As I have sug-
gested above, the Supreme Court of the United States already
abandons the Glucksberg framework and employs what might be
thought of as a strengthened rational basis standard where
enough justices determine that the result under the Williamson
version of rational basis would do injustice, such as in Cleburne
or Lawrence.322 This infidelity to the stated doctrine in hard cases
does nothing to promote the legitimacy of the Court or provide
consistent guidelines for lower courts to follow. Making the impli-
cit standard explicit, and applying it in a consistent manner,
would not only result in a more legitimate doctrine, but would
provide the lower courts with a standard that was actually wor-
thy of that name.
321. Id. at 720 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
322. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
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D. Avoiding the Lochner Problem
One of the criticisms generally associated with any attempt to
strengthen court review over constitutional issues is that streng-
thened review will allow courts to judicially overreach by substi-
tuting their own policy preferences for those of democratically-
elected legislatures, a problem often associated with the Supreme
Court's decision in Lochner.2 3 One prestigious scholar has noted
that "[a]voiding 'Lochner's error' remains a primary focus of con-
stitutional law and constitutional scholarhip."32 Indeed, it seems
almost incumbent on any scholar proposing a theory of unenume-
rated rights to show how the theory would not "revive" the error
of Lochner.3 2 5
Of course, scholars generally disagree regarding what Loch-
ner's error actually was. 326 Insofar as the error is considered to be
a court substituting its policy choices for those of the legislature,
a strengthened rational basis test is not a great danger. As noted
previously, the Court in Lochner reversed the traditional calculus
for due process by requiring the state to justify its exercise of au-
thority and overcome the presumption of "liberty of contract."32 "
Lochner is thus closer to an example of a fundamental rights case
than a rational basis one. Further, Lochner also reflects the for-
malistic law of its time period, in that it appears the Court in
Lochner felt bound to only consider the facts presented to it, and
to try to fit the law into a permissible or impermissible category-
a permissible "health law," or an impermissible "labor law."328
323. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (noting the reluctance to expand substantive
due process "lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed
into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court" (citations omitted)); Moore v. City
of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) ("As the history of the Lochner era demonstrates,
there is reason for concern lest the only limits to [substantive due process] intervention
become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this Court.");
see also Ian Bartrum, The Constitutional Canon as Argumentative Metonymy, 18 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 327, 359 (2009) (calling the traditional perception of Lochner as the
decision "we love to hate: a decision whose symbolic overreach calls into doubt the very
institution of judicial review").
324. David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2003).
325. See Bernstein, supra note 121, at 326 (noting that "avoiding 'Lochner's error' re-
mains the central obsession . . . of contemporary constitutional law."' (citing Gary D. Rowe,
Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 221, 223 (1999))).
326. Bernstein, supra note 324, at 1.
327. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
328. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1904). See also the discussion in the
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Similarly, the other Lochner era cases so often decried as anti-
democratic also fall into the same category. They bear classic
hallmarks of fundamental rights jurisprudence, and reflect con-
cerns over the categorical limitations of legislative power. 329 The
concern in those cases was not that the means were not reasona-
bly related to the ends, but that the means themselves were not a
legally valid way of reaching those ends.
In contrast, a strengthened rational basis test concerns the
nexus between the means and the ends of legislation, and asks
whether the legislation is in fact reasonably related to the ends it
seeks to promote. Thus, the focus is on the validity of the means
by which the ends are promoted. Under a strengthened rational
basis test, a vast majority of laws will still be held to be constitu-
tional, because most laws actually are reasonably related to their
discernible valid legislative purpose. The benefit of the streng-
thened rational basis review will be in those cases where the leg-
islature oversteps its bounds, either through a pretextual law
aimed at unpopular groups or activities, or a belief in a set of
facts proven not to exist. These are exactly the cases where courts
are supposed to step in. Doing so is not substituting the court's
belief for the legislature regarding the best way to accomplish a
particular end, but rather requiring that the legislature's act in-
fringing on liberty actually bear a relation to a valid purpose. Li-
berty should require nothing less.
E. Implementation
Another benefit of using a strengthened rational basis stan-
dard is its ease of implementation. Unlike other substantial due
process "fixes" that would require an overhaul of existing juri-
sprudence, the application of Cleburne-style rational basis to new
due process cases can be accomplished with relatively little
change to the existing jurisprudential structure. In part, this is
because, as noted above, the jurisprudence of substantive due
New York Court of Appeals decision, wherein the majority, considering the statute as a
whole, held that the hours law was a health law rather than a labor law; two judges con-
curred by stating that the law could be both a health law and a labor law; and two judges
dissented, holding that the law was a labor law only. People v. Lochner, 69 N.E. 373, 380-
84, 387-89 (N.Y. 1904).
329. See, e.g., Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 534
(1923); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923).
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process has always been an evolving one, with changes occurring
incrementally.a30 Thus, there is no real baseline that can be
deemed to be the "correct" doctrine, and no substantive due
process cases (i.e., the Slaughter-House Cases) that must be over-
ruled or reinterpreted for the standard to be implemented. Simi-
larly, because the Supreme Court of the United States has in fact
all but ignored its rational basis doctrine in hard cases such as
Lawrence, there is ample competing case law to support such a
change.
Instead, to implement strengthened rational basis, the Court
would only have to begin requiring its use on a prospective basis.
In fact, it seems plausible that lower courts could actually begin
implementing the standard using Lawrence and Cleburne as
precedent. In the same way that substantive due process moved
from Allgeyer to Lochner to Munn to Carolene Products, the ra-
tional basis test can move from its toothless form to one that can
protect liberties while at the same time not usurp the lawmaking
power of federal and state legislatures.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Amendment requires that the rights "retained by
the people" not be den[ied] or disparage [d]3."3 The Supreme Court
of the United States has chosen, for good or ill, to use substantive
due process to protect those rights. While the historical basis for
doing so might be open for debate, the reality is an established
fact.
However, substantive due process, as currently interpreted by
the courts, is broken. Although the Supreme Court of the United
States still professes to adhere to the concepts of tiered scrutiny
as set forth in Glucksberg, this adherence is one of convenience,
and is abandoned in hard cases. While this is less of a problem for
the Supreme Court, it is a problem of great concern for the lower
courts, who continue to attempt to faithfully apply Glucksberg. It
is also a problem for the legitimacy of substantive due process as
a judicial doctrine, as a test with standards that are ignored at
whim leaves the impression that there are really no standards at
all. The problem is the current interpretation of tiered scrutiny,
330. See discussion supra Part III (tracing the history of substantive due process).
331. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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which is based on a strict scrutiny standard for fundamental
rights that is very difficult to overcome, and a rational basis
standard for nonfundamental rights that is almost impossible to
fail. It forces courts to face the prospect of classifying a right as
fundamental, and thus taking it "outside the arena of public de-
bate and legislative action," or applying a rational basis standard
akin to no review at all. Under such circumstances, lower courts,
who cannot creatively interpret their way around the test, too of-
ten fail to protect rights.
While there are no shortage of opinions on ways to fix substan-
tive due process, from abandoning substantive due process in fa-
vor of a privileges or immunities analysis, to applying a "pre-
sumption of liberty," to importing heightened scrutiny from equal
protection analysis, all of these suffer from the same problem-
there is little chance that the Court will abandon its current due
process formulation, at least publicly.
There is another solution, however, that could be adopted by
the Court with little change to the established constitutional or-
der. By adopting a stricter formulation of the rational basis test
requiring that the law truly bear a reasonable relation to its ac-
tual purpose, the all-or-nothing tendencies of the current test can
be ameliorated, and rights can be protected to a greater extent
than is possible under the current formulation. The use of a
strengthened rational basis test would reduce pressure on courts
in hard cases, and would further the legitimacy of substantive
due process. Further, such a change could easily be accomplished
without the necessity of overhauling substantive due process and
endangering the protection of those rights which have already
been deemed fundamental.
Rights are important. However, their protection is only as
strong as the legitimacy of the doctrine that protects them. Apply-
ing Cleburne-style rational basis with teeth in place of the cur-
rent rational basis standard yields a standard that is actually
useful, even in hard cases, which contributes to the legitimacy of
substantive due process as a whole, and helps redeem the prom-
ise of the Ninth Amendment that the rights "retained by the
people" will not be disparaged.
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